WENDYS (WEN)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

WENDYS · Meeting: May 20, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

3

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of 8 Directors

3 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Arthur B. WinkleblackTSR underperformance vs ^MDY benchmark — director since 2016, tenure fully overlaps 3-year underperformance period; 3-year price return -61.4% vs ^MDY positive return, well exceeding the 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year price return also -58.6%, confirming sustained underperformance not a transient trough

Mr. Winkleblack has served since 2016 and his tenure fully covers Wendy's severe stock decline of -61.4% over three years against the S&P MidCap 400 (^MDY), which generated a positive return over the same period — a gap far exceeding the 20-percentage-point threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year return of -58.6% confirms this is sustained underperformance, not a temporary dip, so no 5-year mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Peter W. MayTSR underperformance vs ^MDY benchmark — director since 1993/2008, tenure fully overlaps 3-year underperformance period; 3-year price return -61.4% vs ^MDY positive return, well exceeding the 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year price return also -58.6%, confirming sustained underperformance

Mr. May has served on the board since 2008 and his tenure entirely overlaps Wendy's stock price decline of -61.4% over three years while the S&P MidCap 400 (^MDY) was positive — a gap dramatically exceeding the 20-percentage-point trigger for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year return of -58.6% shows this is not a recent short-term trough, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Richard H. GomezTSR underperformance vs ^MDY benchmark — director since November 2021, tenure exceeds 24 months and meaningfully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; 3-year price return -61.4% vs ^MDY positive return, well exceeding the 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year data not fully applicable but 5-year return of -58.6% confirms no mitigant

Mr. Gomez joined in November 2021, giving him more than 24 months of tenure that covers nearly the entire three-year underperformance period during which Wendy's stock fell -61.4% while the S&P MidCap 400 (^MDY) was positive — far exceeding the 20-percentage-point threshold; the 5-year price return of -58.6% confirms sustained underperformance with no mitigating longer-term track record.

✗ AGAINST
Michelle J. Mathews-SpradlinTSR underperformance vs ^MDY benchmark — director since 2015, tenure fully overlaps 3-year underperformance period; 3-year price return -61.4% vs ^MDY positive return, well exceeding the 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year price return also -58.6%, confirming sustained underperformance

Ms. Mathews-Spradlin has served since 2015 and her tenure fully covers Wendy's -61.4% three-year stock decline against a positive S&P MidCap 400 (^MDY), exceeding the 20-percentage-point trigger for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year return of -58.6% confirms this is not a transient decline, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Peter H. RothschildTSR underperformance vs ^MDY benchmark — director since 2010, tenure fully overlaps 3-year underperformance period; 3-year price return -61.4% vs ^MDY positive return, well exceeding the 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year price return also -58.6%, confirming sustained underperformance

Mr. Rothschild has served since 2010 and his tenure entirely covers Wendy's -61.4% three-year stock decline while the S&P MidCap 400 (^MDY) posted positive returns — a gap far exceeding the 20-percentage-point threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year return of -58.6% confirms sustained multi-year underperformance with no mitigating longer-term track record.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Wendy C. ArlinDirector joined December 2023 — within 24-month new-director exemption window

Ms. Arlin joined the board in December 2023, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so she is not subject to the stock performance trigger; she also brings strong financial expertise as a former Fortune 500 CFO and Big 4 audit partner.

✓ FOR
Michelle Caruso-CabreraDirector joined March 2023 — within 24-month new-director exemption window

Ms. Caruso-Cabrera joined in March 2023, within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR trigger does not apply; she has relevant communications, international business, and financial journalism experience.

✓ FOR
Bradley G. PeltzDirector joined July 2025 — within 24-month new-director exemption window; non-independent director noted

Mr. Peltz joined the board in July 2025, well within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR performance trigger does not apply; although he is classified as non-independent due to his role as Managing Director of a Wendy's franchisee, he does not serve on the audit or compensation committee, so no independence-based policy trigger fires.

Five of the eight director nominees — Winkleblack, May, Mathews-Spradlin, Rothschild, and Gomez — receive AGAINST votes because their tenures meaningfully overlap with Wendy's severe stock underperformance of -61.4% over three years against the S&P MidCap 400 (^MDY), which generated positive returns over the same period, far exceeding the 20-percentage-point trigger for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year return of -58.6% confirms this is sustained underperformance. The three remaining nominees — Arlin, Caruso-Cabrera, and Peltz — qualify for the 24-month new-director exemption and receive FOR votes.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Ken Cook

Total Comp

$4,503,440

Prior Support

N/A

The Interim CEO Ken Cook received total compensation of $4,503,440, which is broadly reasonable for an executive serving in a dual Interim CEO and CFO capacity at a $1.3 billion market cap consumer company facing a turnaround; the annual cash incentive paid out at only 39.6% of target and long-term performance awards vested at only 36.1% of target, demonstrating that the variable pay structure responded meaningfully to poor company performance, which is exactly what a pay-for-performance program should do. The pay mix is heavily weighted toward variable, performance-based equity (performance share units, stock options, and restricted stock units), satisfying the policy's 50-60% variable compensation threshold, and the company maintains a clawback policy that goes beyond minimum regulatory requirements. While Wendy's stock performance has been very weak, the incentive payouts were cut severely in line with that underperformance, so the pay-for-performance alignment check passes.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,576,272

Non-Audit Fees

$85,396

Non-audit fees (tax fees of $66,303 plus other fees of $19,093, totaling $85,396) represent approximately 3.3% of audit fees of $2,576,272, well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of Wendy's size and complexity; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the proxy so no tenure trigger can be applied, and the policy requires confirmed data before voting against on tenure grounds.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 5

Stockholder Proposal Regarding a Restriction on Blank-Check Preferred Stock

✓ FOR
Filed by:Not explicitly named in the provided filing excerptOtherGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
governance/structural ask — restricting blank-check preferred stock limits board's ability to issue shares with superior rights without shareholder approvalno prior year vote history availableboard opposes but company already has no poison pill, suggesting some shareholder-friendly governance

This proposal asks the company to restrict its ability to issue so-called 'blank-check' preferred stock — shares that the board can create and issue with whatever special rights it chooses, without shareholders getting a vote; this is a mainstream governance improvement that removes a tool the board could use to entrench itself or dilute shareholders in ways they cannot control. Restricting blank-check preferred stock aligns with shareholder interests by ensuring that any preferred stock issued in the future would require board accountability to shareholders for the terms, and this type of structural governance proposal generally deserves support as it shifts power toward shareholders. The company already states it has no shareholder rights plan (poison pill), which is positive, but blank-check authority remains a separate concern, and the absence of prior-year vote history means we evaluate on the merits alone, which favor supporting this shareholder-protective measure.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Wendy's annual meeting presents a significantly contested director slate, with five of eight nominees receiving AGAINST votes due to Wendy's severe and sustained stock underperformance of -61.4% over three years against the S&P MidCap 400 (^MDY), which generated positive returns over the same period; only the three newest directors with less than 24 months of tenure receive FOR votes. The auditor ratification and Say on Pay votes both pass, as Deloitte's fees are well within independence thresholds and executive incentive payouts were sharply reduced in line with poor business performance, demonstrating that the pay-for-performance structure functioned as intended.

Filing date: April 2, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

1 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

^MDY__INDEX_BENCHMARK__:S&P MidCap 400 Index