WARNER BROS. DISCOVERY INC SERIES (WBD)

Sector: Communication

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

WARNER BROS. DISCOVERY INC SERIES · Meeting: June 9, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

13

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

13 FOR
✓ FOR
Samuel A. Di Piazza, Jr.

Independent director with strong financial and audit expertise; no overboarding, attendance, or TSR trigger concerns — WBD's 3-year return of +114.9% outperforms the peer group median by +71.8pp, well below the 65pp threshold needed to trigger a concern for strong-positive-TSR companies.

✓ FOR
Richard W. Fisher

Independent director with relevant macroeconomic, regulatory, and technology expertise; no overboarding, attendance, or TSR trigger concerns apply.

✓ FOR
Paul A. Gould

Independent director with deep media/entertainment M&A and investment banking experience; holds two public board seats (Liberty Latin America and Liberty Global), within the four-seat limit; no TSR or other policy triggers apply.

✓ FOR
Debra L. Leefamilial relationship flag noted

Independent director with strong media executive experience; her daughter is employed by WBD as a writer/producer at WGA scale, which is disclosed and arm's-length — this is a lower-level employment relationship rather than proximity to top management, so it does not trigger the familial-relationship No vote under policy; no TSR or other hard triggers apply.

✓ FOR
Joseph M. Levin

Director since 2025 (joined February 1, 2025), well within the 24-month new-director exemption from the TSR trigger; relevant digital/media transformation experience; no other policy concerns identified.

✓ FOR
Anton J. Levy

Director since June 2, 2025, well within the 24-month new-director exemption from the TSR trigger; strong technology investment and digital growth expertise; no other policy concerns identified.

✓ FOR
Kenneth W. Lowe

Independent director with two-decade track record as a media/content CEO; no public board seats outside WBD listed as current; no TSR or other policy triggers apply.

✓ FOR
Fazal F. Merchant

Independent director with strong CFO and cybersecurity background; related-party transaction with Wiz (where he serves as president/CFO) is disclosed and approved as arm's-length; no overboarding or TSR triggers apply.

✓ FOR
Anthony J. Noto

Director since January 8, 2025, well within the 24-month new-director exemption; active public company CEO with relevant digital/fintech expertise; holds two outside public board seats (SoFi and Franklin Resources) — as a sitting CEO, the policy limit is two outside seats, and he holds exactly two, so no overboarding trigger fires.

✓ FOR
Paula A. Price

Independent Audit Committee Chair with extensive CFO and CPA credentials; holds three outside public board seats (Mondelez, Bristol Myers Squibb, Accenture), within the four-seat limit for non-executive directors; no TSR or other policy triggers apply.

✓ FOR
Daniel E. Sanchez

Independent director with deep media/legal expertise and institutional knowledge from prior Discovery board service; holds two outside public board seats (Liberty Latin America and Liberty Global), within limits; no TSR or other policy triggers apply.

✓ FOR
Geoffrey Y. Yang

Independent director with venture capital and media investment expertise; holds one outside public board seat (Franklin Resources); no TSR or other policy triggers apply.

✓ FOR
David M. Zaslav

Executive director (CEO); subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors — WBD's 3-year return of +114.9% outperforms the disclosed peer group median by +71.8pp, which does not exceed the 65pp threshold required to trigger a No vote for companies with strong positive absolute TSR; holds two outside public board seats (Grupo Televisa and Sirius XM), which equals the two-seat limit for sitting CEOs and does not breach the policy threshold; the familial relationship (daughter employed as CNN producer at market-rate compensation) is a lower-level employment relationship and does not trigger the policy's familial-relationship concern.

All 13 director nominees pass policy screens. WBD's 3-year total shareholder return of +114.9% outperforms the disclosed compensation peer group median by +71.8pp, comfortably below the 65pp underperformance threshold that would trigger director No votes for companies with strong positive absolute TSR. Three directors joined in 2025 and are exempt from the TSR trigger under the 24-month new-director rule. No overboarding, independence, attendance, or qualification concerns were identified across the slate.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

David M. Zaslav

Total Comp

$165,009,366

Prior Support

<50%%

CEO pay massively exceeds benchmark — $165M total compensation is far above the expected range for a CEO in the Communication Services sector at WBD's market cap bandPrior Say on Pay vote failed (majority voted AGAINST at 2025 Annual Meeting) — policy requires No vote if company received <70% support and structural issues remainOne-time signing stock option award of 20.9 million options ($65.6M grant-date value) is a large special award on top of regular annual pay, inflating total reported compensationCEO pay-for-performance alignment concern: while 2025 stock performance was exceptional, the compensation structure includes an enormous one-time award that is disproportionate even relative to the company's strong year

CEO David Zaslav received total reported compensation of $165 million in 2025, which is extraordinarily high even for a large-cap media company — the bulk of this amount comes from a single large, one-time stock option award of approximately 20.9 million options (reported value ~$65.6 million at grant) granted in connection with a new employment agreement, on top of $22.6 million in regular annual stock awards, $25.7 million in option awards, and $4.1 million in cash bonus. At the 2025 Annual Meeting, a majority of shareholders voted AGAINST the executive compensation program, and while the company made some structural changes (eliminating single-trigger cash severance, committing to future pay reductions), the fundamental pay level for 2025 — with Mr. Zaslav's total compensation reaching $165 million — has not been remediated and remains far above what would be expected for this role and market cap, failing the policy's prior-year-vote trigger and pay-level benchmark screens.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

17 yrs

Audit Fees

$25,896,615

Non-Audit Fees

$11,450,214

PwC has served as WBD's auditor since September 17, 2008 — approximately 17 years — which is below the 25-year tenure threshold that would trigger a No vote. Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $10,591,317 plus tax fees of $855,072 plus other fees of $3,825 = $11,450,214) represent approximately 44% of core audit fees of $25,896,615, which is below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; the large audit-related fees in 2025 are explained by one-time work preparing audited carve-out financial statements for the proposed separation transactions. PwC is a Big 4 firm fully adequate for a company of WBD's size and global complexity.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Stockholder Proposal submitted by the National Center for Public Policy Research

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:National Center for Public Policy ResearchIdeological — ConservativeDisclosure
Board recommends: AGAINST
ideological filer — National Center for Public Policy Research is a well-documented conservative political advocacy organization, not a neutral fiduciary investor

The National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) is a recognized ideological filer operating from a conservative political perspective — its proxy proposals are designed to advance political and social goals rather than protect shareholder value in a fiduciary sense. Under our voting policy, proposals from ideological filers on either side of the political spectrum are voted AGAINST regardless of how the proposal is framed, because a neutral fiduciary investor would not submit such a proposal. The board also recommends voting against this proposal.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 WBD annual meeting ballot contains four proposals: we vote FOR all 13 director nominees (strong 3-year stock outperformance relative to peers eliminates TSR concerns), FOR auditor ratification (PwC fees and tenure are within policy limits), AGAINST Say on Pay (CEO's $165 million total compensation is far above benchmark and shareholders already rejected the pay program at the 2025 annual meeting with no adequate structural remedy applied to 2025 pay), and AGAINST the stockholder proposal from the National Center for Public Policy Research (an ideological conservative filer whose proposals do not serve neutral fiduciary shareholder interests).

Filing date: April 30, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

9 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

CMCSAComcast Corporation
EAElectronic Arts Inc.
FOXFox Corporation
LBTYALiberty Global Ltd.
METAMeta Platforms, Inc.
NFLXNetflix, Inc.
PARAParamount Global
SIRISirius XM Holdings, Inc.
DISThe Walt Disney Company