VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC (VSH)

Sector: Information Technology

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC · Meeting: May 18, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

3

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Four Class II Directors to Hold Office Until the 2029 Annual Meeting of Stockholders

1 FOR/3 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Michael J. CodyTSR underperformance trigger: VSH 3-year TSR -2.9% vs peer median +68.4%, gap of -71.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2018, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR -11.6% vs peer median +45.4%, gap of -57.0pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, so 5-year mitigant does not apply

Mr. Cody has served since 2018, so his tenure fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period during which Vishay's stock returned -2.9% while the company's own disclosed compensation peer group returned a median of +68.4% — a gap of 71.3 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year record (-11.6% vs. peer median +45.4%, a gap of 57.0pp) also exceeds the threshold, so the 5-year mitigant does not rescue the vote.

✗ AGAINST
Dr. Abraham LudomirskiTSR underperformance trigger: VSH 3-year TSR -2.9% vs peer median +68.4%, gap of -71.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2003, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR -11.6% vs peer median +45.4%, gap of -57.0pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, so 5-year mitigant does not apply

Dr. Ludomirski has served since 2003, so his tenure fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; Vishay's stock returned -2.9% over three years while the company's own compensation peer group returned a median of +68.4%, a gap of 71.3 percentage points well above the 20-point trigger; the 5-year record is similarly poor (-11.6% vs. peer median +45.4%), so the 5-year mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Raanan ZilbermanTSR underperformance trigger: VSH 3-year TSR -2.9% vs peer median +68.4%, gap of -71.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2017, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR -11.6% vs peer median +45.4%, gap of -57.0pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, so 5-year mitigant does not apply

Mr. Zilberman has served since 2017, so his tenure fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; Vishay's stock returned -2.9% over three years while the company's own compensation peers returned a median of +68.4%, a gap of 71.3 percentage points far exceeding the 20-point trigger; the 5-year record (-11.6% vs. peer median +45.4%) also exceeds the threshold, meaning the 5-year mitigant does not apply.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
John MalvisiDirector joined in 2023 — less than 24 months before the measurement period end; new-director exemption considered; tenure partially overlaps underperformance but joined after underperformance was already established

Mr. Malvisi joined the board in 2023, meaning his tenure is less than 36 months and he joined after the underperformance period was already underway; the policy exempts directors who joined within 24 months and provides mitigating context for those who joined during an already-underperforming period, so a No vote is not warranted here.

Three of the four Class II nominees (Cody, Ludomirski, Zilberman) are recommended AGAINST due to severe and sustained stock underperformance: Vishay's 3-year total return of -2.9% trails the company's own disclosed compensation peer group median of +68.4% by 71.3 percentage points, well above the 20-point trigger applicable to companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year record is equally poor, so the mitigant does not apply. John Malvisi is recommended FOR because he joined in 2023 and his tenure does not meaningfully overlap the underperformance period, providing mitigating context under the policy.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Joel Smejkal

Total Comp

$10,335,059

Prior Support

98%+%

CEO Joel Smejkal received total compensation of approximately $10.3 million, which is within a reasonable range for a CEO of a $2.8 billion technology company; the pay structure is appropriately designed with a meaningful portion in variable compensation — roughly 90% of total pay comes from equity awards and performance-based bonuses, well above the 50-60% variable pay threshold required by our policy; although Vishay's stock has underperformed peers significantly over three years, the incentive structure did reflect this — the 2023 performance stock awards paid out at zero (rTSR of 66.4% versus a target of 134.5%), demonstrating that the pay-for-performance linkage is functioning as intended, and prior-year Say on Pay support was over 98%, indicating strong shareholder endorsement of the compensation program.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

0 yrs

Audit Fees

$5,500,000

Non-Audit Fees

$1,000,000

Deloitte & Touche LLP is a new engagement for fiscal year 2026, replacing Ernst & Young LLP after a competitive process conducted by the Audit Committee; as a brand-new auditor, there are no tenure concerns; non-audit fees (audit-related $300K + tax $600K + other $100K = $1,000,000) represent approximately 18% of core audit fees ($5,500,000), well below the 50% threshold; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm fully appropriate for a $2.8B public company with global operations.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Vishay annual meeting presents a mixed ballot: three of four director nominees are recommended AGAINST due to severe multi-year stock underperformance relative to the company's own peer group (a 71-percentage-point gap over three years with no recovery at the five-year horizon), while the new auditor ratification and Say on Pay proposals both warrant support given clean fee ratios, a new-auditor fresh start, and a compensation structure that demonstrably withheld incentive pay when performance targets were missed. Shareholders should note that the Zandman family controls approximately 44% of total voting power, which substantially limits the practical impact of independent shareholder votes against the director nominees.

Filing date: April 8, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

19 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

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STSensata Technologies Holding plc
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TTMITTM Technologies, Inc.
UCTTUltra Clean Holdings, Inc.
VSATViasat, Inc.