VIRTUS INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC (VRTS)

Sector: Financials

    Home/Companies/VRTS/Annual Meeting

2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

VIRTUS INVESTMENT PARTNERS INC · Meeting: May 20, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

6

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Directors

1 FOR/6 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
George R. Aylward3-year TSR trigger: VRTS -16.4% vs peer median +62.7%, gap of -79.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2008; 5-year TSR -34.2% vs peer median +84.4%, gap of -118.6pp also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant applies

Aylward has served as a director since 2008 and the stock has declined 16.4% over three years while the company's own peer group gained a median of 62.7% — a gap of 79 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold that triggers a withheld vote; the five-year record is even worse (down 34.2% versus peers up 84.4%), so the longer track record does not provide any relief.

✗ AGAINST
Peter L. Bain3-year TSR trigger: VRTS -16.4% vs peer median +62.7%, gap of -79.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2019; 5-year TSR gap of -118.6pp also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant applies

Bain has served since October 2019, meaning his tenure covers the full three-year underperformance period; the stock's 79-point lag versus the peer group median over three years, and an even larger gap over five years, triggers a withheld vote with no mitigating relief from the longer track record.

✗ AGAINST
Paul G. Greig3-year TSR trigger: VRTS -16.4% vs peer median +62.7%, gap of -79.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2019; 5-year TSR gap of -118.6pp also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant applies

Greig has served since October 2019, covering the full underperformance period; with the stock down 16.4% over three years against a peer median gain of 62.7%, the 79-point gap far exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the five-year record confirms this is sustained underperformance rather than a temporary dip.

✗ AGAINST
Timothy A. Holt3-year TSR trigger: VRTS -16.4% vs peer median +62.7%, gap of -79.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2009; 5-year TSR gap of -118.6pp also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant applies

Holt has served as a director since 2009 and as independent Chairman, making him one of the longest-tenured members of the board during this extended underperformance period; the stock's 79-point three-year gap versus peers, confirmed by an even wider five-year gap, triggers a withheld vote with no mitigating factors.

✗ AGAINST
Melody L. Jones3-year TSR trigger: VRTS -16.4% vs peer median +62.7%, gap of -79.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2014; 5-year TSR gap of -118.6pp also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant applies

Jones has served since October 2014 and chairs the Compensation Committee, giving her direct responsibility for executive pay decisions throughout this period of severe underperformance; the three-year and five-year TSR gaps versus peers both far exceed the applicable thresholds, triggering a withheld vote.

✗ AGAINST
W. Howard Morris3-year TSR trigger: VRTS -16.4% vs peer median +62.7%, gap of -79.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since March 2021; 5-year TSR gap of -118.6pp also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant applies

Morris joined in March 2021, more than 24 months before the measurement date, so the new-director exemption does not apply; his tenure covers the full three-year underperformance window, and both the three-year and five-year gaps versus peers exceed the policy thresholds, triggering a withheld vote.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
John C. Weisenseel

Weisenseel joined the board in December 2024, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so he is not held accountable for the prior-period underperformance that occurred before his appointment.

Six of the seven nominees trigger a withheld vote under the TSR underperformance policy: Virtus's stock has fallen 16.4% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group gained a median of 62.7%, a gap of 79 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point threshold applicable when absolute returns are negative; the five-year record (down 34.2% vs. peers up 84.4%) confirms this is sustained rather than transient underperformance, so no five-year mitigant applies to any director. Only John Weisenseel, appointed in December 2024, is exempt as a new director.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

George R. Aylward

Total Comp

$6,309,500

Prior Support

92%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of approximately $6.3 million is within a reasonable range for a CEO of a roughly $900 million market cap asset management firm, and the pay structure is appropriately weighted toward variable, at-risk pay — the proxy discloses that 90.8% of the CEO's target pay was at risk, well above the 50-60% threshold the policy requires. Critically, the incentive plan is working as intended: the 2023-2025 performance share awards paid out at zero because the company missed both its relative TSR and relative net flow targets, and the CEO's 2025 annual bonus was cut 24% below target to reflect below-target financial and operational results, demonstrating genuine pay-for-performance alignment. Prior shareholder support was 92%, well above the 70% threshold that would require a response, and the compensation committee made no structural changes — which is appropriate given the program is functioning correctly.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$1,265,800

Non-Audit Fees

$696,550

non-audit fee ratio exceeds 50% threshold: non-audit fees (tax fees $438,950 + audit-related fees $37,300 + all other fees $220,300 = $696,550) represent 55% of core audit fees ($1,265,800)

Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of Virtus's size, but the fees paid for services outside the core audit — including tax advisory, transfer agent controls, and systems reports — totaled approximately $696,550 in 2025, which equals about 55% of the $1,265,800 core audit fee; because this ratio exceeds the 50% threshold, the non-audit relationship has grown large enough to raise concerns about auditor independence, triggering a vote against ratification.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Virtus annual meeting ballot presents three standard proposals; the primary governance concern is severe and sustained stock price underperformance — the shares have declined 16.4% over three years while the company's own peers gained a median of 62.7% — which triggers withheld votes against six of seven director nominees (all except newly appointed John Weisenseel) and a vote against auditor ratification is also warranted because non-audit fees paid to Deloitte represent 55% of core audit fees, exceeding the 50% independence threshold. The Say on Pay vote earns support because the incentive program is functioning correctly: performance awards paid out at zero for the 2023-2025 cycle and the CEO's annual bonus was reduced below target, reflecting genuine pay-for-performance alignment.

Filing date: April 7, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

9 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

Acadian Asset Management Inc.
AMGAffiliated Managers Group, Inc.
ABAllianceBernstein Holding L.P.
APAMArtisan Partners Asset Management Inc.
CNSCohen & Steers, Inc.
FHIFederated Hermes, Inc.
JHGJanus Henderson Group plc
VCTRVictory Capital Holdings, Inc.
WETFWisdomTree, Inc.