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TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC (TRV)

Sector: Financials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC · Meeting: May 20, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

8

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

8 FOR
✓ FOR
Russell G. Golden

Joined in 2023 (within 24 months), exempt from TSR trigger; strong financial accounting credentials as former FASB Chairman and audit partner are highly relevant for an insurance holding company.

✓ FOR
Todd C. Schermerhorn

TRV's 3-year TSR of +82.4% outperforms the peer group median of +79.0% by +3.4pp, far below the 50pp trigger threshold for a strong-positive TSR company; no overboarding, attendance, or independence concerns.

✓ FOR
Thomas B. Leonardi

TRV's 3-year TSR exceeds peer median by +3.4pp, well within the 50pp threshold; insurance industry experience as former AIG executive and Connecticut Insurance Commissioner is directly relevant.

✓ FOR
Alan D. Schnitzer

As CEO-director, subject to the same TSR trigger as all directors; TRV outperforms peer median by +3.4pp over 3 years, no trigger fires; no overboarding concerns as he holds no outside public company board seats.

✓ FOR
Clarence Otis Jr.

TRV's 3-year TSR exceeds peer median, no TSR trigger; serves on Verizon, VF Corporation, and MFS Mutual Funds boards — three seats total for a non-executive director, which is within the four-seat overboarding threshold.

✓ FOR
Bridget van Kralingen

Joined in 2022 — more than 24 months ago but tenure overlaps less than the full 3-year performance window; TSR gap is only +3.4pp above peer median so no trigger fires regardless; technology and financial services expertise is relevant.

✓ FOR
Elizabeth E. Robinson

TRV's 3-year TSR exceeds peer median by +3.4pp, no TSR trigger; her Goldman Sachs treasury and capital markets background is highly relevant for an insurer managing a $100B+ investment portfolio.

✓ FOR
David S. Williams

Joined in 2024, within the 24-month new-director exemption period; retired Deloitte principal with financial advisory and risk management expertise appropriate for the audit and risk committees he serves on.

All eight director nominees receive a FOR vote. TRV's 3-year total shareholder return of +82.4% outperforms the company-disclosed peer group median of +79.0% by +3.4 percentage points, well below the 50pp underperformance threshold that would trigger a negative vote for a company with strong positive returns. No directors are overboarded, attendance was at or above 75% for all nominees, all committee assignments respect independence requirements, and the board has no familial-relationship independence concerns.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Alan D. Schnitzer

Total Comp

$26,968,756

Prior Support

N/A

CEO total compensation of approximately $26.97 million reflects a pay mix that is 95% performance-based (32% annual cash bonus, 38% performance stock awards, and 25% stock options), with fixed base salary representing only 5% of total pay — well within the policy's 40% fixed-pay ceiling and comfortably above the 50-60% variable pay floor. The company's 3-year total shareholder return of +82.4% is in line with the peer group median of +79.0%, so above-benchmark incentive pay is justified by shareholder outcomes. The pay program uses meaningful long-term performance conditions: performance stock awards vest only upon meeting a 3-year adjusted core return on equity threshold, and stock options deliver value only if the stock price rises; there are no time-vested restricted shares, no guaranteed awards, and a robust clawback policy is in place.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

KPMG LLP

Tenure

32 yrs

Audit Fees

$12,166,900

Non-Audit Fees

$3,087,800

⚑ auditor tenure 32 years exceeds 25 year threshold⚑ compelling rationale provided

KPMG has served as TRV's auditor since 1994 (approximately 32 years), which exceeds the 25-year threshold that would normally trigger a negative vote. However, the proxy discloses a specific and compelling rationale for continued engagement: the Audit Committee periodically reviews whether to rotate the auditor and is directly involved in selecting KPMG's lead audit partner upon each mandated rotation, demonstrating active oversight of independence. The non-audit fee ratio (audit-related fees of $2,944,900 plus tax fees of $142,900 equals $3,087,800 in non-audit fees against $12,166,900 in audit fees) is approximately 25%, well below the 50% threshold. The elevated audit-related fees in 2025 are explained by a one-time carve-out audit related to the sale of the Canadian business, a non-recurring transaction, and no material restatements are disclosed. On balance, the tenure concern is mitigated by disclosed audit committee oversight practices, and all other checks pass.

Stockholder Proposals

2 proposals submitted by shareholders

Proposal 5

Shareholder Proposal Relating to a Report on Climate-Related Pricing and Coverage Decisions

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:As You Sow Foundation FundIdeological — ProgressiveDisclosure
Prior-year support: 13% (Identical proposal received approximately 13% support (rejected by more than 87% of shares) at the 2025 annual meeting.)
Board recommends: AGAINST
⚑ ideological filer as you sow⚑ prior year support only 13 percent⚑ company provides extensive existing climate disclosure

As You Sow is a well-known ESG advocacy organization whose proposals consistently serve progressive climate-policy goals rather than neutral fiduciary interests; under the voting policy, proposals from ideological filers are voted against regardless of how the request is framed. Even evaluating the proposal on its merits, it received only approximately 13% shareholder support when an identical resolution appeared on last year's ballot, which is well below the threshold that would signal a genuine shareholder concern. The company already publishes a comprehensive TCFD Report with detailed climate risk, underwriting, and investment portfolio disclosures, and its opposition statement credibly disputes the factual premises of the proposal, further reducing the case for additional prescriptive reporting.

Proposal 6

Shareholder Proposal Relating to an Independent Board Chairman

✓ FOR
Filed by:John CheveddenIndividual ActivistGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
⚑ credible governance activist filer⚑ combined ceo chairman role is legitimate governance concern⚑ no direct prior year vote history for this ask

John Chevedden is a well-established individual governance activist with a strong track record of raising legitimate structural governance issues, and this proposal deserves evaluation on its merits. Separating the CEO and board chairman roles is a mainstream governance improvement that reduces the conflict of interest inherent in having the same person set both management priorities and board oversight agendas; roughly half of S&P 500 companies have already adopted an independent chair or equivalent structure. While Travelers does have an independent Lead Director with meaningful authority, the Lead Director role is structurally subordinate to a combined Chairman-CEO and cannot fully replicate the independence and accountability that a separate board chair provides to shareholders. The company's strong financial performance does not eliminate the governance concern — structural oversight matters regardless of near-term results.

Overall Assessment

The Travelers Companies' 2026 annual meeting ballot is largely straightforward: all eight director nominees receive a FOR vote supported by strong 3-year TSR performance in line with disclosed peers, and the say-on-pay program earns support given its 95% performance-based pay structure and alignment with shareholder returns. The auditor ratification passes on balance despite KPMG's 32-year tenure because the audit committee discloses active oversight and partner rotation practices, and the non-audit fee ratio is well within acceptable limits; the two stockholder proposals split — the As You Sow climate-disclosure proposal is voted against as an ideological filing with only 13% prior-year support, while John Chevedden's independent board chairman proposal receives a FOR vote as a credible governance improvement from a recognized activist whose structural concern about the combined CEO-Chairman role is legitimate regardless of the company's strong performance.

Filing date: April 7, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

13 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

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ALLAllstate Corporation
AXPAmerican Express
AIGAmerican International Group, Inc.
BKBank of New York Mellon
CBChubb Ltd.
HIGHartford Financial Services Group
HUMHumana
LNCLincoln National
MMCMarsh & McLennan
METMetLife Inc.
PGRProgressive Corporation
PRUPrudential Financial Inc.