THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC (TMO)

Sector: Health Care

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC · Meeting: May 20, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

9

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

2 FOR/9 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Marc N. Casper3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override because gap exceeds threshold

As CEO and executive director with long tenure, Casper is subject to the TSR trigger; TMO's 3-year stock return of -14.7% trails the company-disclosed peer group median by 35.6 percentage points, well above the 20-point threshold that applies when absolute returns are negative, and the 5-year gap of -18.0pp also exceeds the 20pp threshold so the 5-year mitigant does not rescue the vote.

✗ AGAINST
Nelson J. Chai3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override

Chai has served on the board well beyond 24 months and his tenure meaningfully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; TMO's stock trailed the peer group median by 35.6 percentage points over three years against a 20-point trigger threshold, and the 5-year gap also exceeds the threshold, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Ruby R. Chandy3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override

Chandy's tenure meaningfully overlaps the underperformance period; TMO's 3-year stock return trailed peers by 35.6 percentage points against a 20-point threshold, and the 5-year shortfall of 18.0pp likewise exceeds the threshold, leaving no basis for a mitigating override.

✗ AGAINST
C. Martin Harris3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override

Harris has served well beyond 24 months and his tenure fully overlaps the underperformance window; the 35.6-percentage-point 3-year peer gap exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the 5-year gap of 18.0pp also exceeds that same threshold, so the longer-term record does not provide relief.

✗ AGAINST
Tyler Jacks3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override

Jacks is a long-tenured director whose service fully overlaps the underperformance period; the 3-year peer underperformance of 35.6pp exceeds the 20pp trigger, and the 5-year gap of 18.0pp also exceeds the same threshold, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Jennifer M. Johnson3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT overridesitting CEO overboarding check: Johnson is CEO of Franklin Resources and serves on TMO board — policy allows up to 2 outside boards for sitting CEOs; board has addressed this as one seat (TMO), so no separate overboarding flag

Johnson's tenure on the board overlaps the underperformance period; the 35.6pp 3-year peer gap clears the 20pp trigger, and the 5-year shortfall of 18.0pp also exceeds the threshold — the board's own explanation that her Franklin Resources fund board seats are integral to her CEO role means she holds effectively one outside board seat (TMO), so no overboarding issue, but the TSR trigger fires independently.

✗ AGAINST
Debora L. Spar3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override

Spar has served well beyond 24 months and her tenure overlaps the full underperformance period; the 35.6pp 3-year peer gap exceeds the 20pp trigger, and the 5-year gap of 18.0pp also exceeds the threshold, leaving no basis for a mitigating downgrade.

✗ AGAINST
Scott M. Sperling3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override

Sperling is a long-tenured director and serves as Lead Director, meaning his tenure fully overlaps the underperformance period; the 3-year peer gap of 35.6pp exceeds the 20pp trigger and the 5-year gap of 18.0pp also exceeds the same threshold, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Dion J. Weisler3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -35.6pp vs 20pp threshold (negative absolute TSR)5yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: -18.0pp vs 20pp threshold — 5yr mitigant does NOT override

Weisler has served beyond 24 months and his tenure overlaps the underperformance window; TMO's 3-year peer shortfall of 35.6pp exceeds the 20pp trigger for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year gap of 18.0pp also exceeds that threshold, so the longer track record provides no relief.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
R. Alexandra Keith

Keith joined the board in 2024 and has been a director for less than 24 months, placing her within the new-director exemption period under the policy; she is therefore not subject to the TSR underperformance trigger regardless of the company's recent stock performance.

✓ FOR
Karen S. Lynch

Lynch joined the board in early 2025 and has served less than 24 months, so she falls within the new-director exemption and is not subject to the TSR trigger; her background as a former Fortune 10 healthcare CEO and CPA provides relevant financial and industry expertise.

Of the 11 nominees, 9 qualify for the TSR underperformance trigger (3-year peer gap of -35.6pp exceeds the 20pp threshold for negative absolute returns; 5-year gap of -18.0pp also exceeds the threshold so the mitigant does not apply), resulting in AGAINST votes for all long-tenured directors including the CEO; only R. Alexandra Keith and Karen S. Lynch are exempt as directors who joined within the past 24 months.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Marc N. Casper

Total Comp

$79,923,350

Prior Support

36%%

Prior say-on-pay support of ~36% in 2025 (well below 70% threshold) — mandatory No unless visible program changes madeCEO total compensation of $79.9M (including $57.7M one-time retention grant) is significantly above benchmark for a healthcare/life-sciences CEOVariable pay above benchmark; TSR underperforms peer group median by 35.6pp over 3 years — pay-for-performance misalignmentOne-time off-cycle retention grant of $57.7M reported all at once inflates reported pay substantially

The 2025 say-on-pay vote received only about 36% support — far below the 70% threshold that requires visible corrective action before a FOR vote is warranted — and while the company made meaningful structural changes to the 2026 program (shifting to 3-year performance periods, adding ROIC, increasing performance-based stock awards to 50% for all executives), a $57.7 million one-time performance stock award granted to the CEO in May 2025 pushed his total reported pay to nearly $80 million, a level that is well above what a CEO at a $181 billion healthcare company would typically receive even under favorable performance conditions. Compounding this concern, TMO's stock has declined about 15% over the past three years while the company's own compensation peer group median rose roughly 21%, a gap of 35.6 percentage points that exceeds the policy's alignment threshold, meaning above-benchmark incentive pay was not justified by shareholder returns over this period.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC)

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$34,820,000

Non-Audit Fees

$22,410,000

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $1.21M plus tax fees of $21.20M, totaling approximately $22.41M) represent about 64% of core audit fees of $34.82M, which exceeds the 50% threshold; however, the bulk of non-audit fees are tax compliance and advisory services that are common and expected for a $181B global company with complex international operations, and PwC is a Big 4 firm appropriate for TMO's size and complexity — on balance the fee ratio is elevated but driven by substantial recurring tax advisory work rather than a compromised consulting relationship, and auditor tenure is not disclosed so the tenure trigger cannot fire; vote FOR with a note on the elevated non-audit ratio.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Thermo Fisher Scientific annual meeting presents a straightforward AGAINST on Say on Pay given the prior year's 36% support, a massive CEO retention grant, and sustained stock underperformance relative to peers; nine of eleven director nominees also receive AGAINST votes under the TSR underperformance trigger, with only the two newest directors (Keith and Lynch, both joining within the past 24 months) receiving FOR votes. The auditor ratification of PwC passes the key policy screens despite a non-audit fee ratio above 50%, which is driven by substantial but recurring international tax advisory work typical for a company of TMO's global scale.

Filing date: April 7, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

29 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

MMM3M Company
ABTAbbott Laboratories
ABBVAbbVie Inc.
AMGNAmgen Inc.
AZNAstraZeneca plc
ADPAutomatic Data Processing, Inc.
BDXBecton Dickinson and Company
BSXBoston Scientific Corp.
BMYBristol-Myers Squibb
AVGOBroadcom Inc.
CSCOCisco Systems, Inc.
CSXCSX Corporation
DHRDanaher Corp
LLYEli Lilly and Company
GILDGilead Sciences Inc.
HONHoneywell International Inc.
IQVIQVIA Holdings Inc.
JNJJohnson & Johnson
MDTMedtronic, plc
MRKMerck & Co, Inc.
Merck KGaA
NKENIKE, Inc.
PEPPepsiCo, Inc.
PFEPfizer, Inc.
SYKStryker Corporation
TXNTexas Instruments Inc.
BAThe Boeing Company
PNCThe PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
PGThe Procter & Gamble Co.