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T1 ENERGY INC (TE)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

T1 ENERGY INC · Meeting: June 17, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

7

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of eight directors, each to serve for a one-year term of office expiring at the 2027 Annual Meeting of Stockholders

1 FOR/7 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Daniel Barcelo⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3yr price return -5.0% vs XLI +79.0%, gap of -84.0pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; no named peer group disclosed so ETF fallback applies; director tenure since 2021 covers full underperformance period; 5yr price return -29.6% also underperforms XLI, so 5yr mitigant does not apply⚑ CEO as director: executive director subject to same TSR trigger independently of Say on Pay vote⚑ familial relationship: son Luca Barcelo employed by the company with escalating salary and STIP/LTIP eligibility

As CEO and Chairman since the company's 2021 listing, Mr. Barcelo has been on the board throughout the full period of severe stock underperformance — the company's 3-year price return of -5.0% trails the XLI industrials ETF benchmark by 84 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-percentage-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year return of -29.6% similarly underperforms XLI, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue the vote; additionally, Mr. Barcelo's son was hired into an escalating compensation arrangement, raising a familial-relationship governance concern.

✗ AGAINST
W. Richard Anderson⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3yr price return -5.0% vs XLI +79.0%, gap of -84.0pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since November 2024 is approximately 18 months, within the 24-month new-director exemption window — however exemption applies only to directors who joined within 24 months of the vote date (June 2026), and Anderson joined November 2024 (~19 months ago), placing him just inside the exemption

Mr. Anderson joined the board in November 2024, approximately 19 months before the June 2026 meeting date, which falls within the 24-month new-director exemption under our policy; therefore, although the company's severe TSR underperformance relative to XLI would otherwise trigger an AGAINST vote, Mr. Anderson is exempt from the TSR trigger and receives a FOR vote on that basis — however, he chairs the Audit and Risk Committee during a period when the company disclosed two separate material weaknesses in internal controls, which is a negative governance signal, but the policy does not prescribe an automatic AGAINST solely for that; on balance, the new-director exemption governs and the vote is FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Todd Jason Kantor⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3yr price return -5.0% vs XLI +79.0%, gap of -84.0pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since April 2024 is approximately 26 months, just outside the 24-month exemption⚑ familial relationship: sister-in-law Amy Jaick served as SVP Communications until May 2025

Mr. Kantor joined the board in April 2024, approximately 26 months before the June 2026 meeting, which is just outside the 24-month new-director exemption; while his tenure covers less than half of the 3-year underperformance measurement period, the policy requires flagging directors in this range, and the magnitude of underperformance (-84 percentage points versus XLI) is so severe that even partial-period accountability is warranted; additionally, his sister-in-law served in a senior paid role at the company during his tenure, raising a familial-relationship concern under our policy.

✗ AGAINST
David J. Manners⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3yr price return -5.0% vs XLI +79.0%, gap of -84.0pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since April 2024 approximately 26 months, just outside 24-month exemption

Mr. Manners joined the board in April 2024, approximately 26 months before the June 2026 meeting, placing him just outside the 24-month new-director exemption; the company's 3-year price return of -5.0% underperforms the XLI industrials ETF by 84 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-percentage-point threshold applicable to companies with negative absolute returns; similar to Mr. Kantor, his tenure covers less than half the full measurement period, but the severity of underperformance and the absence of a 5-year mitigant (5-year return also deeply negative) warrants an AGAINST.

✗ AGAINST
Peter Matrai⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3yr price return -5.0% vs XLI +79.0%, gap of -84.0pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since 2021 covers full underperformance period⚑ related party consulting: receives $30,000/month consulting fee as a sitting director, creating a financial relationship that compromises independence despite board's independent classification

Mr. Matrai has served since the company's 2021 listing and is therefore accountable for the full period of severe underperformance against XLI (-84 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-point trigger threshold); additionally, he receives $30,000 per month in consulting fees from the company while serving as a director — a significant financial relationship that raises serious questions about independence and the governance quality of the board's related-party oversight; the 5-year TSR is also deeply negative, so the mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Daniel Artemus Steingart⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3yr price return -5.0% vs XLI +79.0%, gap of -84.0pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since January 2023 covers the majority of the 3-year underperformance period

Dr. Steingart has served since January 2023, meaning his tenure overlaps with the large majority of the 3-year measurement period during which the company's stock fell -5.0% while XLI rose 79.0%, a gap of 84 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point threshold; the 5-year price return of -29.6% also underperforms XLI over the longer horizon, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply; no overboarding or attendance concerns are identified, but the TSR trigger governs.

✗ AGAINST
Jessica Wirth Strine⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3yr price return -5.0% vs XLI +79.0%, gap of -84.0pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since November 2023 covers more than half of the 3-year underperformance period

Ms. Strine joined the board in November 2023, giving her tenure of approximately 31 months that covers well over half of the 3-year TSR measurement window during which the company lagged XLI by 84 percentage points; the 5-year return is also deeply negative relative to XLI, so the longer-term mitigant does not apply; while her qualifications are strong and she chairs the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, the policy requires an AGAINST vote for directors whose tenure meaningfully overlaps with this level of underperformance.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Robert Hammond⚑ new director exemption: joined March 26, 2026, approximately 3 months before meeting — well within 24-month exemption

Mr. Hammond joined the board in March 2026, only about three months before the annual meeting, which clearly falls within the 24-month new-director exemption from the TSR underperformance trigger; he brings over 40 years of energy industry experience including a long career in investor relations at TotalEnergies, which is relevant to T1 Energy's needs; no overboarding, attendance, or independence concerns are identified.

The board faces severe TSR underperformance: the company's 3-year price return of -5.0% trails the XLI industrials ETF by 84 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-point threshold applicable to companies with negative absolute returns, and the 5-year return of -29.6% also underperforms XLI so the longer-term mitigant does not apply. Only Mr. Hammond (joined March 2026) is clearly within the 24-month new-director exemption and receives a FOR vote; Mr. Anderson (joined November 2024, ~19 months) is also within the exemption window and receives a FOR vote. All other directors whose tenure meaningfully overlaps the underperformance period receive AGAINST votes, compounded in several cases by familial-relationship hiring concerns, a paid consulting arrangement with a sitting director (Matrai), and ongoing material weakness disclosures.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Daniel Barcelo

Total Comp

$5,777,846

Prior Support

N/A

⚑ CEO total comp $5.78M includes $3.75M stock awards and $800K bonus on $800K salary at negative 3yr TSR⚑ CFO total comp $7.01M likely exceeds individual benchmark by material margin for CFO at $2B industrials company⚑ large one time RSU transaction bonuses granted to CEO and CFO on January 1 2025 without clear performance conditions⚑ pay for performance misalignment variable pay above benchmark while 3yr TSR trails XLI by 84pp⚑ two active material weaknesses in internal controls disclosed during compensation year⚑ son of CEO employed with escalating compensation governance concern

The CEO received $5.78 million in total pay for 2025, including a $3.75 million stock award (partly a large one-time transaction bonus of 1,000,000 restricted stock units with no disclosed performance conditions) and an $800,000 cash bonus equal to 100% of salary, all in a year when the company's stock had declined -5.0% over three years while the XLI industrials ETF rose 79.0% — a classic pay-for-performance misalignment where above-benchmark variable pay was awarded despite severe shareholder underperformance. The CFO received $7.01 million including another large one-time transaction bonus (1,500,000 restricted stock units), which is exceptionally high for a CFO at a $2 billion industrials company and almost certainly exceeds the individual benchmark by well more than the 25% policy threshold. Compounding these concerns, the company disclosed two separate material weaknesses in internal controls during the compensation year, yet the compensation committee made no visible adjustment to executive pay to reflect this significant governance failure.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

KPMG LLP

Tenure

1 yrs

Audit Fees

$1,500,000

Non-Audit Fees

$0

KPMG LLP was only appointed in September 2025 (replacing PwC Norway), so its tenure is approximately one year — well below the 25-year threshold that would trigger concern; for fiscal year 2025, KPMG charged $1,500,000 in audit fees and zero in non-audit or other fees, meaning the non-audit fee ratio is 0%, far below the 50% threshold; KPMG is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $2 billion market-cap company; no audit failure restatement attributable to KPMG is identified.

Actual Vote Results

Meeting held June 17, 2026

View 8-K ↗

Director Elections

Nominee% FORVotes ForWithheld / AgainstResult
Peter Matrai
94.7%
169.9M408,111✓ Elected
Robert Hammond
94.7%
169.9M464,953✓ Elected
David J. Manners
94.7%
169.8M361,955✓ Elected
Daniel Barcelo
94.6%
169.8M526,982✓ Elected
Daniel Artemus Steingart
94.6%
169.8M545,254✓ Elected
W. Richard Anderson
94.3%
169.2M1.1M✓ Elected
Todd Jason Kantor
94.0%
168.6M1.8M✓ Elected
Jessica Wirth Strine
93.8%
168.2M2.0M✓ Elected

Say on Pay

78.7%

For 141.1M · Against 29.2M · Abstain 9.1M

✓ Passed

Auditor Ratification

95.5%

For 205.6M · Against 377,828 · Abstain 9.3M

✓ Passed

Other Proposals

Proposal 4

To approve an amendment to the Company's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock from 500,000,000 shares to 1,000,000,000 shares

93.7%
✓ Passed

Overall Assessment

The 2026 T1 Energy annual meeting presents a ballot dominated by governance concerns: six of eight director nominees receive AGAINST votes due to the company's severe 3-year stock underperformance of -84 percentage points versus the XLI industrials ETF, compounded by familial-hiring practices, a paid consulting arrangement with a sitting director, and two disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls. The Say on Pay vote also receives an AGAINST due to large one-time stock bonuses granted to the CEO and CFO without clear performance conditions in a year of continued stock underperformance, while the auditor ratification (KPMG, first full year, zero non-audit fees) and the authorized share increase (operationally necessary given tight remaining headroom) both receive FOR votes.

Filing date: May 18, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence