S&P GLOBAL INC (SPGI)

Sector: Financials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

S&P GLOBAL INC · Meeting: May 20, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

10

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

10 FOR
✓ FOR
Marco Alverà

Director since 2017 with relevant energy/finance experience; no overboarding (no current listed company directorships); TSR trigger does not fire as SPGI's 3-year return of +29.8% is strong positive and the gap to peer median of -18.2pp is well below the 65pp threshold required to trigger a No vote.

✓ FOR
Martina Cheung

CEO and director since 2024, well within the 24-month new-director exemption from the TSR trigger; no overboarding; her appointment as CEO in November 2024 predates the measurement period for accountability purposes.

✓ FOR
Jacques Esculier

Director since 2022 with extensive CEO and industrial leadership experience; no current listed company directorships; TSR trigger does not fire given the -18.2pp peer gap is well below the 65pp strong-positive threshold.

✓ FOR
Stephanie Hill

Director since 2017 with technology and operations expertise relevant to SPGI's data and AI strategy; no overboarding (no current listed company directorships); TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Rebecca Jacoby

Director since 2014 with deep technology and operations background from Cisco; serves as Audit Committee Chair and has no current listed company directorships beyond a prior advisory board role; TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Hubert Joly

Director since January 2026, well within the 24-month new-director exemption from the TSR trigger; holds one current public company board seat (Johnson & Johnson), no overboarding concern; brings extensive CEO leadership and transformation experience.

✓ FOR
Ian Livingston

Director since 2020 and independent Board Chair with strong financial services and telecom leadership background; holds one current public listed company directorship (National Grid plc), no overboarding concern; TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Robert Moritz

Director since February 2026, well within the 24-month new-director exemption from the TSR trigger; holds two current public company board seats (Walmart and Northern Trust), no overboarding concern; brings deep audit, accounting, and financial services expertise as former PwC Global Chairman.

✓ FOR
Maria Morris

Director since 2016 with extensive financial services experience from MetLife; holds two current public company board seats (Allstate and Wells Fargo), no overboarding concern; TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Gregory Washington

Director since 2021 with STEM and technology research background relevant to SPGI's data strategy; no current publicly listed company directorships; TSR trigger does not apply.

All ten director nominees receive a FOR vote determination. SPGI's 3-year total shareholder return of +29.8% is strongly positive, and the company's underperformance versus the compensation peer group median of -18.2 percentage points is well below the 65-percentage-point threshold required to trigger an AGAINST vote under the strong-positive TSR tier. No directors are overboarded, no attendance issues were disclosed, and no independence or familial relationship concerns were identified. Two new directors (Joly and Moritz, both joining in early 2026) are exempt from the TSR trigger under the 24-month new-director rule.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Martina Cheung

Total Comp

$12,831,062

Prior Support

68.8%%

prior say on pay below 70 percentcompany engaged and disclosed remediation

The 2025 Say-on-Pay vote received only 68.8% support — below the 70% threshold that normally requires visible program changes — but the proxy provides a clear and specific explanation: the low vote stemmed almost entirely from a one-time enhanced severance package for a departing executive (Adam Kansler) during the 2024 CEO transition, not from structural compensation concerns. The company conducted significantly expanded shareholder outreach, doubled the number of investors contacted, and explicitly committed that enhanced severance arrangements will not be a recurring feature of the program. The underlying pay program structure is sound: approximately 92% of CEO target compensation is variable and performance-based, the short-term incentive plan uses objective revenue and margin metrics, and the long-term performance stock awards use a rigorous 3-year cumulative earnings-per-share target that paid out at 182% for the 2023-2025 cycle based on verified performance. CEO total compensation of $12.8 million is reasonable for a large-cap financial data company with $15.3 billion in revenue and strong earnings growth, and the company maintains robust clawback policies, stock ownership requirements, and anti-hedging provisions.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$18,038,139

Non-Audit Fees

$4,078,939

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $3,407,452 plus tax fees of $667,567 plus all other fees of $3,920, totaling approximately $4,079,000) represent roughly 22.6% of core audit fees of $18,038,139, well below the 50% threshold that would trigger a No vote. EY is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of SPGI's size and complexity. Auditor tenure is not disclosed in the proxy, so the tenure trigger does not fire per policy. No material financial restatements were identified.

Stockholder Proposals

2 proposals submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Shareholder Proposal to Reduce Stock Ownership Threshold for Calling a Special Shareholder Meeting

✓ FOR
Filed by:John CheveddenIndividual ActivistGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
credible governance activist filergovernance structural askcurrent 25 percent threshold is high for large capno prior year vote history

John Chevedden is a well-known and credible individual governance activist with a long track record of submitting substantive governance-improvement proposals; this type of filer receives serious evaluation under policy. The proposal asks to reduce the threshold for shareholders to call a special meeting from 25% to 10% — a straightforward governance improvement that increases shareholder accountability rights. A 25% ownership threshold is practically unusable at a $128 billion market cap company, since assembling 25% of shares among shareholders willing to formally call a meeting is virtually impossible, making the right illusory rather than meaningful. Reducing the threshold to 10% would align SPGI with approximately 22% of S&P 500 companies that already provide this right at 10%, and would give shareholders a more realistic avenue to address urgent governance or strategic concerns between annual meetings. The board's opposition — that 25% is market-standard and that 10% could enable narrow interests — does not outweigh the legitimate governance benefit of making this shareholder right actually usable.

Proposal 5

Shareholder Proposal to Issue a Report on the Company's Charitable Support

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:The Heritage FoundationIdeological — ConservativeDisclosure
Board recommends: AGAINST
ideological conservative filerproposal serves political advocacy goals not shareholder interests

The Heritage Foundation is a well-known conservative advocacy organization, and this proposal is a textbook example of an ideologically motivated filing: the supporting statement focuses almost entirely on the company's relationship with the Human Rights Campaign and transgender healthcare coverage, framing a political and social policy objection as a shareholder risk concern. Under policy, proposals from ideological filers — whether conservative or progressive — are voted AGAINST regardless of how they are framed, because they serve political advocacy goals rather than neutral fiduciary interests. A neutral institutional investor would not submit this specific proposal, which is designed to pressure the company to align its charitable giving with conservative social priorities. The board's response is adequate — SPGI already discloses its charitable activities in an Annual Impact Report and maintains a governance process for grant-making — and no additional report is needed to serve legitimate shareholder interests.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 SPGI annual meeting presents a largely clean ballot: all ten director nominees receive FOR votes as the company's strong positive 3-year total shareholder return and modest peer underperformance do not trigger any TSR-based concerns, and auditor Ernst & Young passes on fees and independence grounds. The Say-on-Pay vote also receives a FOR determination despite last year's below-70% result, because the company provided a specific and credible explanation (a one-time executive severance event) and conducted meaningful shareholder engagement with visible remediation commitments. On stockholder proposals, the special meeting threshold reduction from credible activist John Chevedden receives a FOR vote as a legitimate governance improvement, while the Heritage Foundation's charitable report proposal receives an AGAINST vote as an ideologically motivated filing that does not serve neutral shareholder interests.

Filing date: March 31, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

16 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

AXPAmerican Express
ADPAutomatic Data Processing
BLKBlackRock
CMECME Group
FISFidelity National Information Services
FIFiserv
ICEIntercontinental Exchange
MMCMarsh & McLennan
MAMastercard
MCOMoody's Corporation
PYPLPayPal
STTState Street
SCHWThe Charles Schwab Corporation
TRIThomson Reuters
TROWT. Rowe Price Group
VVisa