SLEEP NUMBER CORP (SNBR)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

SLEEP NUMBER CORP · Meeting: May 21, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

3

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

/3 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Phillip M. Eyler3-year TSR trigger: SNBR -94.5% vs peer median -28.1%, gap of -66.4pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR also triggers: -98.7% vs peer median -47.7%, gap of -51.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director joined 2022, tenure overlaps substantially with underperformance period

Mr. Eyler has served on the Sleep Number board since 2022, meaning his tenure substantially overlaps with the severe stock price decline — the stock has fallen roughly 94.5% over three years versus a peer group median decline of only 28.1%, a gap of 66.4 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year check does not provide relief because the 5-year gap of 51.0pp also exceeds the same 20pp threshold, confirming sustained underperformance rather than a temporary trough.

✗ AGAINST
Julie M. Howard3-year TSR trigger: SNBR -94.5% vs peer median -28.1%, gap of -66.4pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR also triggers: -98.7% vs peer median -47.7%, gap of -51.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director joined 2020, tenure fully overlaps with underperformance period

Ms. Howard has served on the Sleep Number board since 2020, so her tenure fully covers the period of dramatic underperformance — the stock is down roughly 94.5% over three years while the peer group median fell only 28.1%, a gap of 66.4 percentage points well above the 20-point policy threshold; the five-year check confirms the underperformance is sustained rather than recent, as the five-year gap of 51.0pp also exceeds the threshold, warranting an against vote.

✗ AGAINST
Angel L. Mendez3-year TSR trigger: SNBR -94.5% vs peer median -28.1%, gap of -66.4pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR also triggers: -98.7% vs peer median -47.7%, gap of -51.0pp exceeds 20pp threshold; director joined 2022, tenure overlaps substantially with underperformance period; also serves on board of Peloton Interactive (PTON), a peer company that itself declined 60% over 3 years

Mr. Mendez has served on the Sleep Number board since 2022, overlapping substantially with the period in which the stock collapsed roughly 94.5% versus a peer median decline of only 28.1% — a 66.4-percentage-point gap that far exceeds the 20-point trigger; the five-year check provides no relief as the 51.0pp five-year gap also exceeds the threshold; additionally, Mr. Mendez serves on the board of Peloton Interactive, which is itself one of the worst performers in the disclosed peer group, raising a secondary concern about his broader oversight record.

For Analysis

All three director nominees are recommended AGAINST. Sleep Number's stock has declined approximately 94.5% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group fell only 28.1% at the median — a gap of 66.4 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point policy threshold applicable when absolute returns are negative. All three nominees have been on the board long enough that their tenure substantially overlaps with this period of destruction of shareholder value. The five-year TSR check confirms the underperformance is sustained: the five-year gap of 51.0pp also exceeds the applicable threshold, so no downgrade to FOR is warranted. The company is in a turnaround led by a new CEO who joined in April 2025, which provides some mitigating context, but does not exempt long-tenured directors from accountability for the multi-year performance record.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Linda A. Findley

Total Comp

$6,233,574

Prior Support

77.63%%

CEO total compensation of $6,233,574 includes a $10,000,000 front-loaded inducement equity grant (reported at grant-date fair value of $3,671,258 due to stock price decline) that is exceptionally large relative to a company with a $37M market capPay-for-performance misalignment: stock down ~94.5% over 3 years while CEO received a $2.5M cash sign-on bonus and large equity awardsFixed/cash components (base salary $853,846 + $1,250,000 sign-on cash bonus) represent a substantial portion of reported $6.2M total compensation for a partial year of servicePerformance stock units earned 0% payout for the 2023-2025 cycle; 2025 AIP earned 0% payout — realizable pay is low, but the reported grant values and cash sign-on are disproportionate to company size and shareholder experiencePrior Say on Pay support of 77.63% is above the 70% threshold but warrants scrutiny given continued underperformance

While the compensation committee made genuine efforts to tie pay to performance — the 2023-2025 performance stock awards paid out at 0% and the 2025 annual bonus also paid out at 0% — the new CEO's total reported compensation of $6.2 million for less than a full year of service is extremely difficult to reconcile with a company whose total market value has fallen to approximately $37 million; the single large award granted at hire (valued at $10 million at the intended grant price, delivered partly as a $2.5 million cash sign-on bonus and large equity awards) means shareholders are being asked to ratify a pay package worth roughly one-sixth of the entire company's current market value for a CEO who joined during the reporting year. The pay-for-performance alignment check also fails: variable pay (in the form of the large inducement equity grant and cash sign-on) is well above benchmark levels for a company of this size, yet shareholders have experienced a three-year total return of negative 94.5% compared to the peer median of negative 28.1% — a 66-percentage-point gap that represents one of the most severe underperformance cases in the peer universe. Although the prior Say on Pay vote of 77.63% technically clears the 70% engagement threshold, the ongoing and worsening shareholder value destruction combined with the magnitude of the CEO compensation package relative to company size supports an AGAINST vote.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

16 yrs

Audit Fees

$1,179,010

Non-Audit Fees

$159,075

Deloitte has served as Sleep Number's auditor since 2010, giving it approximately 16 years of tenure — below the 25-year threshold that would trigger concern. Non-audit fees (tax compliance services of $159,075) represent about 13.5% of combined audit and audit-related fees of $1,179,010, comfortably below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns. No material financial restatements attributable to audit failure were identified. Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a public company of this size and complexity.

Overall Assessment

This is a highly contested ballot for a company in severe financial distress: the stock has lost roughly 95% of its value over three years, wiping out nearly all shareholder wealth, and all three director nominees are recommended AGAINST on the grounds that their tenure substantially overlaps with this period of catastrophic underperformance relative to peers. The Say on Pay vote is also recommended AGAINST because the new CEO's reported compensation package — totaling $6.2 million including a $2.5 million cash sign-on and a $10 million inducement equity grant — is disproportionate to a company with a current market value of approximately $37 million, even though actual incentive plan payouts were zero; in contrast, the three governance improvement proposals (board declassification and elimination of supermajority voting requirements) are straightforwardly positive for shareholders and should be supported, as should auditor ratification given clean fee ratios and appropriate tenure.

Filing date: April 8, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

16 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

ARLOArlo Technologies, Inc.
DLBDolby Laboratories, Inc.
ETHEthan Allen Interiors, Inc.
HVTHaverty Furniture Companies, Inc.
HNIHNI Corporation
INSPInspire Medical Systems, Inc.
IRBTiRobot Corporation
LZBLa-Z-Boy Incorporated
LEGLeggett & Platt, Incorporated
MLKNMiller Knoll
PTONPeloton Interactive, Inc.
RHRH
TPXSomnigroup International Inc.
SONOSonos, Inc.
SCSSteelcase Inc.
AANThe Aaron's Company, Inc.