STEPAN (SCL)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

STEPAN · Meeting: April 28, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

2

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

1 FOR/2 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Joaquin Delgado3-year TSR underperformance: SCL -45.1% vs peer median -0.9%, gap of -44.2pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR also deeply negative (-57.7% vs peer median -6.2%, gap -51.5pp exceeds threshold); director since 2011, full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Mr. Delgado has served since 2011, giving him full accountability for Stepan's stock losing 45% over the past three years while the company's own peer group was essentially flat — a gap of 44 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point threshold our policy applies when a company's stock has fallen; the 5-year record is even worse (-57.7% vs. peers at -6.2%), so the longer track record provides no mitigating relief.

✗ AGAINST
F. Quinn Stepan, Jr.3-year TSR underperformance: SCL -45.1% vs peer median -0.9%, gap of -44.2pp exceeds 20pp threshold; 5-year TSR gap of -51.5pp also exceeds threshold; director since 1999, full tenure overlap; familial relationship — brother Richard Stepan is an executive officer of the company; non-independent director

Mr. Stepan has served since 1999 and was CEO until April 2022, giving him direct accountability for the company's severe stock underperformance — shares have fallen 45% over three years while peers were flat, a 44-percentage-point gap well above the 20-point trigger; additionally, his brother Richard Stepan serves as a named executive officer, raising a familial-relationship governance concern under our policy, and the 5-year record (-57.7% vs. -6.2% for peers) confirms this is not a short-term blip.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Corning F. PainterDirector since June 2025 — exempt from TSR trigger (joined within past 24 months); currently serves as CEO of Orion S.A., a public company — check for overboarding

Mr. Painter joined the board in June 2025, less than 24 months ago, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under our policy; he does not appear to hold 2 or more outside public board seats as a sitting CEO (his only disclosed outside public board seat is Stepan), so no overboarding concern applies, and he brings relevant chemicals industry CEO experience.

Of the three nominees, only Mr. Painter is new enough to the board (joined June 2025) to be exempt from the TSR trigger; both Mr. Delgado (director since 2011) and Mr. Stepan (director since 1999, former CEO, familial tie to an executive officer) are subject to AGAINST votes because Stepan's stock has lost 45% over three years against a peer group that was nearly flat, a gap of 44 percentage points — more than double the 20-point policy threshold that applies when a company's absolute 3-year return is negative.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Luis E. Rojo

Total Comp

$4,327,042

Prior Support

96%%

CEO total compensation of $4.33 million is modest for a $1.1 billion specialty chemicals company and does not appear excessive relative to the role and market; the pay mix is appropriate — base salary ($940,000) represents roughly 22% of total compensation, well under the 40% fixed-pay ceiling, with the majority in equity and performance-based incentives; critically, the short-term bonus paid out at only 25% of the CEO's target because the company missed its most important financial goal (net income came in below the minimum threshold), demonstrating that the pay-for-performance link is actually working — executives received far less than they could have in a strong year, which is exactly what a well-designed incentive plan should produce.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,655,300

Non-Audit Fees

$705,200

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $52,600 plus tax fees of $652,600 = $705,200) are approximately 27% of audit fees ($2,655,300), well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the proxy so the tenure trigger cannot fire; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $1.1 billion market-cap company, and no material restatements were disclosed.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Stepan annual meeting ballot has three proposals; we vote FOR on Say on Pay (the incentive plan paid out at just 25% of CEO target due to missed financial goals, showing the pay-for-performance link is working) and FOR on Deloitte's ratification (non-audit fees well within policy limits), but vote AGAINST two of the three director nominees — Mr. Delgado and Mr. Stepan — because Stepan's stock has lost 45% over three years against a peer group that was essentially flat, a 44-percentage-point gap that triggers our underperformance policy, with the 5-year record providing no relief; only newly appointed Mr. Painter is exempt as a director who joined within the past 24 months.

Filing date: March 25, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

15 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

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ASHAshland Inc.
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CBTCabot Corporation
FMCFMC Corp.
FULH.B. Fuller Company
NGVTIngevity Corporation
IOSPInnospec Inc.
KOPKoppers Holdings, Inc.
MTXMinerals Technologies Inc.
NEUNewMarket Corporation
KWRQuaker Chemical Corporation
RPMRPM International Inc.
SXTSensient Technologies Corporation
CCThe Chemours Company