PFIZER INC (PFE)

Sector: Health Care

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

PFIZER INC · Meeting: April 23, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

10

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

2 FOR/10 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Ronald E. Blaylock3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Blaylock has served since 2017, giving him full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; Pfizer's stock has trailed its disclosed compensation peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years (against a 20-point policy threshold for negative absolute TSR), and the 5-year gap of 83.8 percentage points also exceeds the threshold, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Albert Bourla3yr TSR underperformance vs peer groupexecutive director TSR trigger

As Chairman and CEO since 2018 and 2019 respectively, Bourla has full overlap with the underperformance period; Pfizer's stock has trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, far exceeding the 20-point threshold for negative absolute TSR, and the 5-year gap likewise exceeds the threshold, so the long-term mitigant does not rescue this vote; the TSR trigger on executive directors operates independently of the Say on Pay vote.

✗ AGAINST
Susan Desmond-Hellmann3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Desmond-Hellmann has served since 2020, giving her meaningful overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; Pfizer's stock trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, well above the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year gap also exceeds the threshold so the long-term mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Joseph J. Echevarria3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Echevarria has served since 2015, giving him full overlap with the underperformance period; Pfizer's stock trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, far exceeding the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year gap likewise exceeds the threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Scott Gottlieb3yr TSR underperformance vs peer groupoverboarding

Gottlieb triggers two separate policy concerns: he serves on four public company boards (Pfizer, UnitedHealth Group, Illumina, and Tempus AI), which meets the overboarding threshold of four or more seats; and as a director since 2019 he has full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period during which Pfizer trailed its peer group median by 85.6 percentage points.

✗ AGAINST
Dan R. Littman3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Littman has served since 2018, giving him full overlap with the underperformance period; Pfizer's stock trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, far exceeding the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year gap likewise exceeds the threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Shantanu Narayen3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Narayen has served since 2013 and as Lead Independent Director since 2018, giving him extensive overlap with the underperformance period; Pfizer's stock trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, far exceeding the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year gap likewise exceeds the threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Suzanne Nora Johnson3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Nora Johnson has served since 2007, giving her full overlap with the underperformance period; Pfizer's stock trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, far exceeding the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year gap likewise exceeds the threshold.

✗ AGAINST
James Quincey3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Quincey has served since 2020, giving him meaningful overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; Pfizer's stock trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, well above the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year gap also exceeds the threshold so the long-term mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
James C. Smith3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group

Smith has served since 2014, giving him full overlap with the underperformance period; Pfizer's stock trailed the peer group median by 85.6 percentage points over three years, far exceeding the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year gap likewise exceeds the threshold.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Mortimer J. Buckley

Buckley joined the board in October 2024, approximately 18 months before the April 2026 meeting, placing him within the 24-month new-director exemption and therefore exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger.

✓ FOR
Cyrus Taraporevala

Taraporevala joined the board in June 2024, approximately 22 months before the April 2026 meeting, placing him within the 24-month new-director exemption and therefore exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger.

The policy triggers an AGAINST vote for 10 of 12 nominees due to severe, sustained stock price underperformance: Pfizer's shares have fallen 17.5% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group gained a median of 68.1%, a gap of 85.6 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point policy threshold for companies with negative absolute TSR; the 5-year gap of 83.8 percentage points also exceeds the threshold so the long-term mitigant cannot downgrade any AGAINST to FOR; the two newest directors, Buckley (joined October 2024) and Taraporevala (joined June 2024), are exempt because they have served less than 24 months; Scott Gottlieb also separately triggers the overboarding policy by sitting on four public company boards.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

A. Bourla

Total Comp

$27,585,301

Prior Support

54.7%%

prior say on pay below 70pct with responsive actions takenTSR underperformance context

The 2025 Say on Pay vote received only 54.7% support, which is below the 70% threshold that would trigger an automatic AGAINST if no changes were made; however, Pfizer has taken meaningful, concrete steps in response — the committee committed to no future mid-stream award modifications (the primary cause of the low vote), increased the share of pay delivered as performance share awards from 50% to 75% of long-term incentives, enhanced disclosure on goal-setting, and added an earnings metric to the bonus plan — so the policy's non-response trigger does not fire. CEO total pay of approximately $27.6 million is broadly in line with benchmark expectations for a large-cap global pharmaceutical CEO at a company with $156 billion in market capitalization, and the pay structure is heavily weighted toward variable performance-based compensation (base salary is only about 6.5% of total target pay), satisfying the pay mix requirement. While Pfizer's stock has significantly underperformed its peer group over three years, the incentive plan does contain meaningful performance conditions including absolute total shareholder return hurdles on long-term awards and relative TSR modifiers on performance share awards, so the program is not equivalent to fixed pay disguised as variable pay.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

KPMG LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

The auditor fee data was not available in extractable numeric form from the provided filing text, and KPMG's tenure at Pfizer is not explicitly stated in the excerpted proxy materials; under the policy, where tenure cannot be confirmed the trigger does not fire, and without fee data the non-audit ratio cannot be calculated, so the default vote of FOR applies; KPMG is a Big 4 firm fully appropriate for a company of Pfizer's size and complexity.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 5

Adopt an Independent Chair Policy

✓ FOR
Filed by:Not identified in available filing excerptOtherGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
combined CEO chair rolesevere TSR underperformance contextgovernance structural ask

This is a mainstream governance proposal asking that the board chair be an independent director rather than the same person who serves as CEO — a structural change that directly addresses the concentration of power in a single individual and is supported by a wide range of institutional investors as a best-practice safeguard. The context at Pfizer strengthens the case for this proposal: the company has experienced severe stock price underperformance, with Pfizer shares down 17.5% over three years while the peer group median gained 68.1%, yet Dr. Bourla continues to hold both the CEO and Chair positions, meaning there is no independent voice at the head of the body that evaluates management's performance. While Pfizer does have a Lead Independent Director with well-defined responsibilities, that role is not a full substitute for an independent chair because the Lead Independent Director does not set board agendas, control the flow of information to the board, or chair full board meetings in normal circumstances — all of which remain with the combined CEO/Chair; supporting this proposal would introduce a more robust check on management accountability without disrupting Pfizer's operations.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Pfizer ballot presents significant governance concerns driven primarily by severe, sustained stock price underperformance: Pfizer shares have lost 17.5% over three years while the company's own peer group gained a median of 68.1%, triggering AGAINST votes for 10 of 12 director nominees under the policy's TSR accountability framework, with only the two newest directors exempt; the Say on Pay vote is a close call given last year's 54.7% support, but Pfizer's concrete and meaningful program changes in response tip the determination to FOR, while the independent chair shareholder proposal is supported given the severity of the underperformance and the absence of a fully independent board leader.

Filing date: March 12, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

12 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

ABBVAbbVie Inc.
AMGNAmgen Inc.
AZNAstraZeneca PLC
BMYBristol-Myers Squibb Company
LLYEli Lilly and Company
GILDGilead Sciences, Inc.
GSKGSK plc
JNJJohnson & Johnson
MRKMerck & Co., Inc.
NVSNovartis AG
RHHBYRoche Holding AG
SNYSanofi