PURECYCLE TECHNOLOGIES INC (PCT)

Sector: Materials

    Home/Companies/PCT/Annual Meeting

2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

PURECYCLE TECHNOLOGIES INC · Meeting: May 7, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

3

Directors AGAINST

6

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

3 FOR/6 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Steven BouckTSR underperformance: PCT 3-year return -10.7% vs XLI +69.0%, gap of -79.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; joined 2022, tenure overlaps full underperformance period; 5-year return -78.9% vs XLI does not mitigate

Mr. Bouck joined in 2022 and his full tenure overlaps a period in which PureCycle's stock fell roughly 11% while the industrials benchmark (XLI) gained 69%, a gap of nearly 80 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point trigger; the 5-year record is even worse (-78.9%) and does not provide relief from this determination.

✗ AGAINST
Tanya BurnellTSR underperformance: PCT 3-year return -10.7% vs XLI +69.0%, gap of -79.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; joined 2021, tenure overlaps full underperformance period; 5-year return -78.9% vs XLI does not mitigate

Ms. Burnell joined in 2021 and her full tenure covers the period of significant underperformance; PureCycle's stock declined while XLI rose 69% over three years, a gap far exceeding the policy trigger, and the five-year record is similarly poor.

✗ AGAINST
Daniel CoombsTSR underperformance: PCT 3-year return -10.7% vs XLI +69.0%, gap of -79.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; joined 2022, tenure overlaps full underperformance period; 5-year return -78.9% vs XLI does not mitigate

Mr. Coombs joined in 2022 and served as Executive Chairman through mid-2024, making him particularly accountable for the company's direction during the underperformance period; the -79.7pp gap versus XLI triggers a NO vote, and the five-year record does not mitigate.

✗ AGAINST
Allen JacobyTSR underperformance: PCT 3-year return -10.7% vs XLI +69.0%, gap of -79.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; joined 2022, tenure overlaps full underperformance period; 5-year return -78.9% vs XLI does not mitigate

Mr. Jacoby joined in 2022 and has served as Lead Independent Director, a senior oversight role, throughout the underperformance period; the nearly 80-point gap to XLI over three years far exceeds the threshold, and the five-year record does not rescue this determination.

✗ AGAINST
Fernando MusaTSR underperformance: PCT 3-year return -10.7% vs XLI +69.0%, gap of -79.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; joined 2021, tenure overlaps full underperformance period; 5-year return -78.9% vs XLI does not mitigate

Mr. Musa has served since 2021, giving him full exposure to the underperformance period; with PureCycle stock down and XLI up 69% over three years, the policy trigger fires clearly, and the five-year picture (-78.9% vs XLI) provides no mitigating relief.

✗ AGAINST
Dustin OlsonTSR underperformance: PCT 3-year return -10.7% vs XLI +69.0%, gap of -79.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; executive director subject to same TSR trigger; joined board 2022 as CEO; 5-year return -78.9% vs XLI does not mitigate

As CEO and a board member since 2022, Mr. Olson is directly accountable for company performance; the policy applies the TSR trigger to executive directors independently of the Say on Pay vote, and PureCycle's nearly 80-point underperformance versus XLI over three years triggers a NO vote regardless of compensation structure.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Daniel GibsonJoined 2025 — within 24-month new director exemption

Mr. Gibson joined the board in 2025, which is within the 24-month window during which new directors are exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger, and no other policy concerns (overboarding, attendance, independence) are identified.

✓ FOR
Siri JirapongphanJoined October 2025 — within 24-month new director exemption

Dr. Jirapongphan was appointed in October 2025, well within the 24-month exemption period for new directors, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply and no other policy concerns are identified.

✓ FOR
Valerie MarsJoined January 2026 — within 24-month new director exemption

Ms. Mars joined the board effective January 1, 2026, placing her squarely within the 24-month new director exemption, and no other policy flags are triggered.

Of the nine nominees, five long-tenured directors (Bouck, Burnell, Coombs, Jacoby, Musa) and CEO Olson as an executive director all trigger a AGAINST determination due to severe TSR underperformance — PureCycle's stock fell ~11% over three years while the industrials benchmark (XLI) gained 69%, a gap of nearly 80 percentage points that far exceeds the 30pp policy threshold for negative absolute TSR; the five-year record (-78.9%) provides no mitigating relief. Three directors (Gibson, Jirapongphan, Mars) are exempt as new directors within the 24-month protection window.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Dustin Olson

Total Comp

$6,237,167

Prior Support

98%%

CEO total compensation $6.24M potentially above benchmark for industrials company at ~$954M market capSpecial fully-vested stock award of 200,000 shares (~$2.27M) granted to CEO with no performance conditions — effectively fixed pay disguised as equityPay-for-performance misalignment: above-benchmark equity grants issued while stock declined 28.5% in one year and underperformed XLI by nearly 80pp over three yearsIncentive plan has a portion with no meaningful performance conditions (200,000 fully vested shares vest regardless of outcomes)

The CEO received $6.24 million in total compensation in 2025, which is elevated for an early-revenue industrial company at roughly $1 billion in market cap, and notably includes a 200,000-share award that was granted fully vested with no performance conditions whatsoever — meaning shareholders gave away roughly $2.27 million in stock that required nothing from the CEO in return, which our policy treats as fixed pay disguised as an equity award. Although the formulaic short-term bonus paid out at only 28% of target (reflecting missed production and revenue goals), the company simultaneously granted above-target long-term equity while PureCycle's stock fell 28.5% in the past year and underperformed the industrials benchmark (XLI) by nearly 80 percentage points over three years — a clear pay-for-performance misalignment that warrants a NO vote.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Grant Thornton LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$914,064

Non-Audit Fees

$22,226

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $16,250 plus other fees of $5,976, totaling $22,226) represent only about 2.4% of audit fees of $914,064, well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; Grant Thornton is a large national firm appropriate for a company of PureCycle's size, no material restatements are disclosed, and auditor tenure is not confirmed in the filing so the tenure trigger cannot fire.

Overall Assessment

This ballot covers three standard proposals: director elections, auditor ratification, and say on pay. We vote AGAINST six of nine director nominees (all long-tenured directors plus CEO Olson) due to severe stock underperformance versus the XLI industrials benchmark, vote FOR auditor ratification as fee ratios and firm quality are satisfactory, and vote AGAINST the say on pay proposal primarily because a fully-vested no-conditions stock award to the CEO represents pay with no performance link at a time when shareholders have suffered significant losses.

Filing date: March 27, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence