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ON SEMICONDUCTOR CORP (ON)

Sector: Information Technology

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

ON SEMICONDUCTOR CORP · Meeting: May 14, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

7

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

/7 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Susan K. Carter⚑ 3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: ON -2.1% vs peer median +104.0%, gap of -106.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR

ON's 3-year stock return of -2.1% trails the compensation peer group median of +104.0% by about 106 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger for directors with negative absolute returns; however, the 5-year check shows ON's 140.8% 5-year return versus the peer median of +144.7%, a gap of only about 3.9 percentage points, which does NOT exceed the applicable 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant applies and the vote is downgraded to FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Thomas L. Deitrich⚑ 3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: ON -2.1% vs peer median +104.0%, gap of -106.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR

ON's 3-year stock return of -2.1% trails the compensation peer group median of +104.0% by about 106 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger for directors with negative absolute returns; however, the 5-year check shows ON's 140.8% 5-year return versus the peer median of +144.7%, a gap of only about 3.9 percentage points, which does NOT exceed the applicable 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant applies and the vote is downgraded to FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Hassane El-Khoury⚑ 3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: ON -2.1% vs peer median +104.0%, gap of -106.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR⚑ executive director CEO

As CEO and director, El-Khoury is subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors; ON's 3-year return of -2.1% trails the peer median by 106 percentage points, well above the 20-point threshold for negative absolute returns; however, the 5-year gap of only 3.9 percentage points does NOT exceed the 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant applies and the vote is downgraded to FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Bruce E. Kiddoo⚑ 3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: ON -2.1% vs peer median +104.0%, gap of -106.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR

ON's 3-year stock return of -2.1% trails the compensation peer group median of +104.0% by about 106 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger for directors with negative absolute returns; however, the 5-year check shows ON's 140.8% 5-year return versus the peer median of +144.7%, a gap of only about 3.9 percentage points, which does NOT exceed the applicable 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant applies and the vote is downgraded to FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Paul A. Mascarenas⚑ 3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: ON -2.1% vs peer median +104.0%, gap of -106.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR⚑ longest tenured director since 2014

Mascarenas has been on the board since 2014, making him the longest-serving nominee and fully accountable for the multi-year underperformance period; ON's 3-year return of -2.1% trails the peer median by 106 percentage points, well above the 20-point threshold; however, the 5-year gap of only 3.9 percentage points does NOT exceed the 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant applies and the vote is downgraded to FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Gregory L. Waters⚑ 3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: ON -2.1% vs peer median +104.0%, gap of -106.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR

ON's 3-year stock return of -2.1% trails the compensation peer group median of +104.0% by about 106 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger for directors with negative absolute returns; however, the 5-year check shows ON's 140.8% 5-year return versus the peer median of +144.7%, a gap of only about 3.9 percentage points, which does NOT exceed the applicable 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant applies and the vote is downgraded to FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Christine Y. Yan⚑ 3yr TSR underperformance vs peer group: ON -2.1% vs peer median +104.0%, gap of -106.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR

ON's 3-year stock return of -2.1% trails the compensation peer group median of +104.0% by about 106 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger for directors with negative absolute returns; however, the 5-year check shows ON's 140.8% 5-year return versus the peer median of +144.7%, a gap of only about 3.9 percentage points, which does NOT exceed the applicable 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant applies and the vote is downgraded to FOR.

For Analysis

The 3-year TSR trigger fires for all seven nominees — ON's 3-year return of -2.1% underperforms the disclosed compensation peer group median of +104.0% by approximately 106 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold that applies when absolute 3-year returns are negative. However, the 5-year mitigant applies to every nominee: ON's 5-year return of +140.8% trails the peer 5-year median of +144.7% by only about 3.9 percentage points, which is well within the 20pp threshold. Under policy, when the 5-year relative performance does not exceed the applicable threshold, the vote is downgraded from AGAINST to FOR, reflecting that the 3-year trough appears to be a recent development within an otherwise adequate longer-term track record. Accordingly, the vote determination is FOR all seven nominees. No overboarding, attendance, independence, or qualification concerns were identified for any nominee.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Hassane El-Khoury

Total Comp

$17,678,866

Prior Support

86%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of $17.7 million is within a reasonable range for a semiconductor company CEO at ON's market cap of roughly $35 billion, and the pay structure is heavily performance-based — approximately 93% of the CEO's actual 2025 target pay was variable, with 65% tied to measurable performance goals (performance stock awards) and the remainder tied to the stock price (time-based restricted stock units). Incentive pay was meaningfully reduced by poor relative stock performance: the company's one-year TSR ranked at just the 6th percentile among peers, cutting the first tranche of performance stock awards by 50%, and the CEO voluntarily forfeited his entire cash bonus for 2025, showing real alignment between executive outcomes and shareholder experience. Prior say-on-pay support was 86%, above the 70% threshold that would require a negative vote absent remediation, and the company has robust clawback policies, no excessive perquisites, and no tax gross-ups, so there are no structural concerns that would warrant a NO vote.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

⚑ tenure not disclosed⚑ fee amounts not extractable from provided text

The auditor fee table provided in the filing excerpt does not contain the actual dollar amounts for audit fees and non-audit fees, so the non-audit fee ratio test cannot be calculated; per policy, when fee data cannot be determined from the available text, the default vote is FOR. PricewaterhouseCoopers is a Big 4 firm fully appropriate for a $35 billion market cap company, auditor tenure is not explicitly disclosed in the provided filing text so the tenure trigger cannot fire, and no material financial restatements are indicated, so there are no grounds to vote against ratification.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Majority Vote Standard

✓ FOR
Filed by:John CheveddenIndividual ActivistGovernance
⚑ credible governance activist filer⚑ mainstream governance ask eliminate supermajority⚑ board neutral no recommendation⚑ proposal is advisory only

John Chevedden is a well-known individual governance activist with a long track record of submitting legitimate, shareholder-friendly governance proposals, and this proposal asks the company to replace supermajority voting requirements with simple majority voting — one of the most mainstream and widely supported governance improvements in corporate America, adopted at hundreds of large public companies. Supermajority voting thresholds can allow management to block changes that most shareholders support, so eliminating them directly protects shareholder rights. The board itself made no recommendation against this proposal and acknowledged it would support the concept if approved, which further supports a FOR vote.

Actual Vote Results

Meeting held May 14, 2026

View 8-K ↗

Director Elections

Nominee% FORVotes ForWithheld / AgainstResult
Hassane El-Khoury
99.7%
340.6M1.1M✓ Elected
Gregory L. Waters
98.3%
335.7M5.9M✓ Elected
Susan K. Carter
96.6%
329.8M11.7M✓ Elected
Thomas L. Deitrich
95.8%
327.3M14.3M✓ Elected
Bruce E. Kiddoo
95.3%
325.2M16.2M✓ Elected
Paul A. Mascarenas
92.6%
316.2M25.2M✓ Elected
Christine Y. Yan
92.3%
315.5M26.2M✓ Elected

Say on Pay

93.7%

For 320.3M · Against 21.1M · Abstain 339,418

✓ Passed

Auditor Ratification

93.4%

For 337.2M · Against 23.7M · Abstain 152,678

✓ Passed

Other Proposals

Proposal 4

Stockholder proposal regarding simple majority voting

97.9%
✓ Passed

Overall Assessment

The 2026 ON Semiconductor annual meeting features four proposals: director elections where the 5-year TSR mitigant saves all seven nominees from an AGAINST vote despite severe 3-year peer underperformance; a say-on-pay vote that passes on the strength of a heavily performance-linked pay structure and the CEO's voluntary bonus forfeiture; an auditor ratification with no fee or tenure red flags visible in the available data; and a shareholder proposal from governance activist John Chevedden to eliminate supermajority voting requirements, which merits support as a straightforward improvement to shareholder rights. The most significant governance concern for shareholders is ON's sharp 3-year stock underperformance relative to semiconductor peers, though the longer 5-year track record remains adequate.

Filing date: April 2, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

14 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

AMDAdvanced Micro Devices, Inc.
ADIAnalog Devices, Inc.
AMATApplied Materials, Inc.
FSLRFirst Solar, Inc.
LRCXLam Research Corporation
MRVLMarvell Technology, Inc.
MCHPMicrochip Technology Incorporated
MUMicron Technology, Inc.
MPWRMonolithic Power Systems, Inc.
NXPINXP Semiconductors N.V.
QRVOQorvo, Inc.
SWKSSkyworks Solutions, Inc.
TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated
WOLFWolfspeed, Inc.