PLAYSTUDIOS INC CLASS A (MYPS)

Sector: Communication

    Home/Companies/MYPS/Annual Meeting

2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

PLAYSTUDIOS INC CLASS A · Meeting: July 10, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Directors

/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Andrew PascalTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr return -88.4% vs XLC +92.3%, gap of -180.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5yr return -94.7% also triggers; executive director subject to same TSR trigger as all other directors

As CEO and Chairman since 2021, Mr. Pascal has overseen catastrophic stock losses — the shares have fallen roughly 88% over three years while the sector ETF (XLC) gained about 92%, a gap of nearly 181 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point trigger threshold; the 5-year record is equally poor (-94.7% vs. benchmark), so no 5-year mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Jason KrikorianTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr return -88.4% vs XLC +92.3%, gap of -180.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since June 2021 covers full underperformance period; 5yr trigger also fires

Mr. Krikorian has served since June 2021, giving him tenure that fully overlaps the severe underperformance period; MYPS shares have lost about 88% over three years while XLC gained roughly 92%, a gap of ~181 percentage points well beyond the 30-point threshold, and the 5-year record provides no mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Joe HorowitzTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr return -88.4% vs XLC +92.3%, gap of -180.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since June 2021 covers full underperformance period; 5yr trigger also fires

Mr. Horowitz has served since June 2021 and his tenure fully overlaps the period of extreme underperformance; with a 3-year stock return of -88.4% against the XLC sector ETF benchmark return of +92.3%, the gap of ~181 percentage points dramatically exceeds the 30-point threshold, and the 5-year return of -94.7% provides no mitigating long-term track record.

✗ AGAINST
Judy K. MencherTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr return -88.4% vs XLC +92.3%, gap of -180.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since June 2021 covers full underperformance period; 5yr trigger also fires

Ms. Mencher has served since June 2021 and her tenure fully covers the underperformance period; the stock has lost roughly 88% over three years while the XLC sector ETF gained about 92%, a gap of ~181 percentage points far exceeding the 30-point trigger, and the 5-year picture (-94.7%) offers no mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Steven J. ZanellaTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr return -88.4% vs XLC +92.3%, gap of -180.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; tenure since December 2021 covers substantially all of the underperformance period; 5yr trigger also fires

Mr. Zanella joined in December 2021, giving him tenure that covers nearly the entire severe underperformance period; the 3-year stock return of -88.4% versus the XLC benchmark return of +92.3% produces a gap of ~181 percentage points well beyond the 30-point threshold, and the 5-year return of -94.7% provides no mitigating long-term record.

For Analysis

All five directors are subject to an AGAINST vote under the TSR underperformance trigger. The company's stock has declined approximately 88% over three years while the Communication Services sector ETF (XLC) gained about 92%, producing a gap of roughly 181 percentage points that vastly exceeds the 30-point threshold applicable when absolute TSR is negative. The 5-year return of -94.7% confirms this is sustained multi-year destruction of shareholder value rather than a transient trough, so no 5-year mitigant applies. All directors have tenure that meaningfully overlaps the full underperformance period.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Andrew Pascal

Total Comp

$3,795,552

Prior Support

N/A

pay for performance misalignment: variable pay above benchmark while TSR underperforms sector by ~181pp over 3 years; equity awards potentially lack meaningful performance conditions: PSUs were forfeited because performance goals were not achieved, but RSU grants vest solely on time with no performance requirement; CEO base salary elevated relative to $68M market cap company

CEO Andrew Pascal received total compensation of approximately $3.8 million in 2025 — including a $750,000 base salary, a $500,000 cash bonus, and stock awards valued at about $2.5 million — at a company with a market cap of only $68 million, which is significantly above what would be expected for a CEO at a micro-cap Communications Services company. While performance stock awards were forfeited after failing to meet goals (a positive sign), the majority of the long-term equity program consists of time-vesting restricted stock units that deliver value regardless of company performance, and the company's 3-year stock return of -88.4% dramatically underperforms the XLC sector ETF by approximately 181 percentage points, demonstrating that above-benchmark incentive pay is not aligned with shareholder outcomes. The pay-for-performance disconnect is severe enough to warrant a NO vote under the policy.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$827,000

Non-Audit Fees

$551,000

non audit fee ratio exceeds 50pct: non-audit fees (tax $536K + other $15K = $551K) are approximately 67% of audit fees ($827K), exceeding the 50% threshold

The proxy discloses that Deloitte received $827,000 in audit fees and $551,000 in non-audit fees (tax services of $536,000 plus other fees of $15,000) for 2025, making non-audit fees approximately 67% of audit fees — well above the 50% threshold that raises concerns about the auditor's independence from management; auditor tenure is not disclosed so that trigger does not fire, but the fee ratio alone is sufficient to warrant a vote against ratification.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 PLAYSTUDIOS annual meeting presents a ballot where all five director nominees warrant AGAINST votes due to catastrophic stock underperformance (-88.4% over three years versus the XLC sector ETF at +92.3%), executive compensation warrants an AGAINST vote given the severe pay-for-performance misalignment at a $68 million market cap company, and auditor ratification warrants an AGAINST vote because non-audit fees represent approximately 67% of audit fees, exceeding the independence threshold; the only proposal that warrants a FOR vote is the reverse stock split authorization, which is a necessary measure to address the company's Nasdaq minimum bid price deficiency.

Filing date: May 29, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence