MIDDLEBY CORP (MIDD)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

MIDDLEBY CORP · Meeting: May 19, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

6

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

6 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Sarah Palisi Chapin3-year TSR trigger: MIDD 3yr return -1.7% vs peer median +49.5%, gap -51.2pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2013, full tenure overlap5-year TSR does not provide mitigant: MIDD 5yr return -11.7% vs peer median +60.4%, gap -72.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold

Chapin has served since 2013, meaning her entire tenure overlaps with the company's sustained underperformance; Middleby's 3-year stock return of -1.7% trails the compensation peer group median by 51.2 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold that triggers a vote against for directors with tenure covering the underperformance period, and the 5-year record (-72.1pp gap) provides no mitigating relief.

✗ AGAINST
Timothy J. FitzGerald3-year TSR trigger: MIDD 3yr return -1.7% vs peer median +49.5%, gap -51.2pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director and CEO since 2019, full tenure overlap5-year TSR does not provide mitigant: MIDD 5yr return -11.7% vs peer median +60.4%, gap -72.1pp exceeds 20pp thresholdExecutive director subject to TSR trigger independent of Say on Pay vote

As CEO and director since 2019, FitzGerald has full tenure overlap with the company's sustained underperformance; Middleby's stock has declined approximately 2% over three years while the compensation peer group gained nearly 50% on average, a gap of 51 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point policy threshold, and the five-year record is worse still, offering no mitigating relief under the longer-term check.

✗ AGAINST
Cathy L. McCarthy3-year TSR trigger: MIDD 3yr return -1.7% vs peer median +49.5%, gap -51.2pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2015, full tenure overlap5-year TSR does not provide mitigant: MIDD 5yr return -11.7% vs peer median +60.4%, gap -72.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold

McCarthy has served since 2015, giving her full overlap with the underperformance period; the company's three-year stock return trails the peer group median by 51 percentage points under the policy's negative-absolute-TSR threshold of 20 points, and the five-year record extends and deepens that underperformance, removing any basis for leniency under the longer-term mitigant check.

✗ AGAINST
Robert A. Nerbonne3-year TSR trigger: MIDD 3yr return -1.7% vs peer median +49.5%, gap -51.2pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2019, full tenure overlap5-year TSR does not provide mitigant: MIDD 5yr return -11.7% vs peer median +60.4%, gap -72.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold

Nerbonne has served since 2019 and thus bears full accountability for the underperformance period; the 51-percentage-point gap between Middleby's three-year stock return and the peer group median far exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold, and the five-year comparison is similarly damaging, offering no basis to downgrade the vote to a FOR.

✗ AGAINST
Gordon J. O'Brien3-year TSR trigger: MIDD 3yr return -1.7% vs peer median +49.5%, gap -51.2pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2005 and Chairman since 2019, full tenure overlap5-year TSR does not provide mitigant: MIDD 5yr return -11.7% vs peer median +60.4%, gap -72.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold

O'Brien has been a director since 2005 and non-executive Chairman since 2019, meaning he bears significant responsibility for board oversight during the entire underperformance period; Middleby's stock has lagged the peer group median by 51 percentage points over three years and by 72 percentage points over five years, both far exceeding the applicable thresholds, and as Chairman he is particularly accountable for the board's failure to address sustained value destruction.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Julie M. Bowerman

Bowerman joined the board in 2025, placing her within the 24-month exemption window, so she is not subject to the TSR underperformance trigger; her marketing and consumer-products background is relevant to Middleby's commercial foodservice business.

✓ FOR
Glenn A. Eisenberg

Eisenberg joined the board in 2026, well within the 24-month exemption period, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he brings deep public-company CFO and audit committee experience relevant to Middleby's financial oversight needs.

✓ FOR
Edward P. Garden

Garden joined the board in 2025, placing him within the 24-month exemption window; he was nominated under a cooperation agreement with an activist investor and brings significant financial and strategic experience, including a track record of shareholder value engagement.

✓ FOR
Christopher M. Hix

Hix joined the board in 2026, well within the 24-month exemption period, so the TSR trigger does not apply; his background as a public-company CFO is directly relevant to Middleby's audit and financial oversight needs.

✓ FOR
Stephen R. Scherger

Scherger joined the board in 2024, which is within the 24-month exemption window at the time of this 2026 annual meeting, so the TSR trigger does not apply; his active CFO experience at a large public company provides directly relevant financial expertise.

✓ FOR
Tejas P. Shah

Shah joined the board in 2024, placing him within the 24-month exemption window, so the TSR trigger does not apply; his technology and cybersecurity background addresses identified board skill needs.

The board slate of eleven nominees triggers AGAINST votes for six long-tenured directors — Chapin (since 2013), McCarthy (since 2015), FitzGerald, Nerbonne, and O'Brien (all since 2019) — because Middleby's stock has declined roughly 2% over three years while the compensation peer group gained nearly 50% on average, a 51-percentage-point gap that far exceeds the 20-point policy threshold for companies with negative absolute returns, and the five-year record provides no mitigating relief; five newer directors (Bowerman, Eisenberg, Garden, Hix, Scherger, and Shah) fall within the 24-month exemption and receive FOR votes.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Timothy J. FitzGerald

Total Comp

$8,207,849

Prior Support

95%%

CEO total compensation of approximately $8.2 million is within a reasonable range for a CEO of a $7.2 billion industrial company, base salary has been frozen at $975,000 since 2019, and the pay mix is sound — 66% of CEO target compensation is performance-based, well above the policy's 50-60% threshold for variable pay. Critically, the incentive programs demonstrated genuine pay-for-performance alignment in the most recent year: the annual cash bonus paid out at zero because the company missed its earnings targets, and the three-year performance stock awards vested at only approximately 38% of target due to below-target performance combined with a downward adjustment for poor relative stock performance. The program's structure — including a TSR modifier that directly reduced equity payouts because of poor shareholder returns, plus a meaningful clawback policy — reflects the kind of alignment between executive and shareholder outcomes that the policy is designed to support.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

The proxy filing does not include an auditor fee table with specific audit and non-audit fee amounts, so the non-audit fee ratio trigger cannot be assessed; auditor tenure is also not disclosed in the available filing text, so the tenure trigger cannot fire under policy rules that require confirmed data; in the absence of any confirmed disqualifying trigger, the default vote is FOR, with the absence of fee and tenure disclosure noted as a minor transparency gap.

Overall Assessment

Middleby's 2026 annual meeting presents a mixed ballot: the Say on Pay vote earns support because the pay program's structure demonstrably reduced executive payouts in line with poor company performance, but six of eleven director nominees — including the CEO and four other long-tenured board members — receive AGAINST votes due to Middleby's sustained and severe stock underperformance (approximately negative 2% over three years against a peer group median of positive 49.5%, a gap of over 51 percentage points) with no five-year mitigant available. The auditor ratification receives a default FOR vote because key fee and tenure data were not available in the filing to trigger any disqualifying condition.

Filing date: April 8, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

24 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

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SNASnap-on Incorporated
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XYLXylem Inc.