ELI LILLY (LLY)
Sector: Health Care
2026 Annual Meeting Analysis
ELI LILLY · Meeting: May 4, 2026
Directors FOR
4
Directors AGAINST
0
Say on Pay
FOR
Auditor
FOR
Director Elections
Election of Directors
Dr. Bertozzi joined the board in 2025, which is within the 24-month exemption window, so the TSR trigger does not apply; she brings world-class scientific credentials (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry) directly relevant to Lilly's drug discovery mission, holds only one other public board seat (OmniAb), and attended all meetings during her short tenure.
Dr. Kaelin has served since 2012 and Lilly's 3-year price return of +181.3% far exceeds the XLV sector ETF benchmark by +162.2 percentage points, which is well above the 65-percentage-point underperformance threshold required to trigger a no vote for strong-positive TSR companies; he holds one other public board seat (IQVIA) and brings Nobel Laureate oncology research expertise that is highly relevant to Lilly's pipeline.
Mr. Moeller joined the board in 2024, which is within the 24-month exemption window, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he brings deep financial acumen as former CFO and CEO of Procter & Gamble, serves as an audit committee financial expert, and holds one other public board seat (Procter & Gamble).
Mr. Ricks has served as CEO and director since 2017 and Lilly's 3-year price return of +181.3% outperforms the XLV sector ETF by +162.2 percentage points, far exceeding the 65-percentage-point threshold required to trigger a no vote; as an executive director he holds one outside public board seat (Adobe), which does not trigger the overboarding policy for sitting CEOs (threshold is two or more outside seats).
All four nominees pass the policy screens: Lilly's exceptional 3-year TSR of +181.3% versus XLV's +19.1% (a +162.2pp outperformance gap, well above the 65pp no-vote threshold for strong-positive TSR companies) means no TSR trigger fires for any tenured director; both newer directors (Bertozzi, Moeller) are within the 24-month exemption; no overboarding, independence, attendance, or qualification concerns were identified for any nominee.
Say on Pay
✓ FORCEO
David A. Ricks
Total Comp
$36,698,337
Prior Support
96%%
CEO total compensation of approximately $36.7 million is high in absolute terms but is consistent with Lilly's position as one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world (market cap ~$812 billion), and the pay structure is heavily weighted toward performance-based variable pay — base salary of $1.7 million represents only about 4.6% of total compensation, far below the 40% fixed-pay threshold that would trigger a no vote. The incentive pay is clearly tied to measurable performance outcomes: the 2025 cash bonus paid out at 218% of target reflecting 45% revenue growth and 86% non-GAAP EPS growth, while the 2023 performance stock awards (both the shareholder value award and relative value award) paid out at 200% based on Lilly's stock price rising 183% and its TSR beating the peer group median by 168 percentage points over three years — a direct and verifiable link between incentive pay and shareholder returns. Prior year say-on-pay support was 96%, well above the 70% threshold, the company discloses a robust clawback policy, and there are no material governance concerns with the pay structure.
Auditor Ratification
✓ FORAuditor
Ernst & Young LLP
Tenure
N/A
Audit Fees
$17,400,000
Non-Audit Fees
$2,200,000
Non-audit fees (tax fees of $1.4M plus other advisory fees of $0.8M = $2.2M) represent approximately 12.6% of audit fees ($17.4M), which is well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; EY is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of Lilly's size and complexity; auditor tenure is not explicitly disclosed in the proxy so the tenure trigger cannot be applied, and no material financial restatements were identified.
Stockholder Proposals
2 proposals submitted by shareholders
Proposal 6
Shareholder Proposal to Adopt a Policy and Amend the Bylaws to Require an Independent Board Chair
This proposal asks Lilly to separate the roles of board chair and CEO, which is a legitimate governance ask that some shareholders support; however, Lilly has implemented a genuinely strong lead independent director structure with clearly defined and substantive responsibilities including leading CEO performance evaluations, running executive sessions at every board meeting, approving agendas, and engaging directly with shareholders — these are the core functions an independent chair would perform. Given the absence of any disclosed prior-year vote showing strong shareholder support for this proposal, Lilly's exceptional stock performance under the current structure, and the robustness of the existing independent oversight framework, the structural concern that typically drives support for this proposal is largely addressed, and a vote against is appropriate at this time.
Proposal 7
Shareholder Proposal to Prepare an Annual Lobbying Report
This proposal asks Lilly to publish an annual report on its lobbying activities, which is a straightforward transparency ask — the lowest-bar category of stockholder proposals — and is particularly material for a major pharmaceutical company that actively lobbies on drug pricing, patent protection, and regulatory policy, all of which directly affect shareholder value and business risk. Lilly does provide some existing disclosure on its website regarding LillyPAC contributions and trade association memberships, but a formal annual lobbying report would consolidate and standardize this information in a way that shareholders can use to assess alignment between Lilly's stated values and its political spending. The board's own disclosure notes that it receives semi-annual updates on political engagement, confirming that the underlying data exists and that producing a structured annual report would not be an undue burden.
Overall Assessment
The 2026 Eli Lilly annual meeting ballot is straightforward to evaluate: Lilly's outstanding 3-year total shareholder return of +181.3% (versus the XLV healthcare sector ETF's +19.1%) clears every performance hurdle across director elections, say-on-pay, and pay-for-performance alignment, supporting FOR votes on the core management proposals. The two shareholder proposals are split — the independent chair proposal is opposed because Lilly's robust lead independent director structure already performs those functions, while the lobbying disclosure proposal is supported as a reasonable transparency ask that is material for a company of Lilly's scale and political engagement.