LEGGETT & PLATT INC (LEG)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

LEGGETT & PLATT INC · Meeting: May 21, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

8

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Eight Directors

/8 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Angela Barbee3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2022, tenure overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Ms. Barbee has served since 2022 and her tenure fully overlaps a period of severe stock underperformance — Leggett's shares fell about 67% over three years while the company's own compensation peer group gained about 32% on average, a gap of roughly 98 percentage points, which far exceeds the 20-point threshold required to trigger a vote against a director; the five-year record is equally poor, so no mitigating long-term track record applies.

✗ AGAINST
Robert E. Brunner3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2009, long tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Mr. Brunner has served since 2009 and his lengthy tenure encompasses the entire period of severe underperformance — Leggett's shares lost about 67% over three years while the peer group gained roughly 32%, a gap far exceeding the 20-point trigger threshold; the five-year record shows an even larger gap of about 100 percentage points, so there is no longer-term track record to soften the concern.

✗ AGAINST
Mary Campbell3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2019, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Ms. Campbell has served since 2019 and her full tenure coincides with the period of severe stock underperformance — Leggett's three-year return of about -67% trails the peer group median of about +32% by roughly 98 percentage points, far above the 20-point threshold; the five-year comparison confirms the pattern with a gap of about 100 percentage points, eliminating any mitigating effect from a stronger longer-term record.

✗ AGAINST
Karl G. Glassman3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2002, CEO since May 2024 (executive director subject to same TSR trigger); 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Mr. Glassman serves as both CEO and Board Chairman and has been a director since 2002, meaning his tenure fully covers the period of severe underperformance; as the policy requires, executive directors are subject to the same TSR trigger as independent directors, and the roughly 98-percentage-point gap in three-year returns far exceeds the threshold; this vote against him as a director is separate from the Say on Pay evaluation.

✗ AGAINST
Joseph W. McClanathan3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2005, long tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Mr. McClanathan has served since 2005 and his tenure fully encompasses the period of deep underperformance — Leggett's shares fell about 67% over three years while peers gained roughly 32%, a gap of about 98 percentage points against a 20-point trigger; the five-year gap of about 100 percentage points confirms sustained underperformance with no mitigating long-term track record.

✗ AGAINST
Srikanth Padmanabhan3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2018, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Mr. Padmanabhan has served since 2018 and his tenure covers the full period of severe stock underperformance; the roughly 98-percentage-point three-year gap against Leggett's own peer group far exceeds the 20-point threshold for negative absolute TSR, and the five-year comparison shows an equally wide gap, leaving no basis for a mitigating longer-term track record.

✗ AGAINST
Jai Shah3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2019, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Mr. Shah has served since 2019 and his tenure spans the entire period of severe underperformance; with Leggett's three-year total return about 98 percentage points below the peer group median — far above the 20-point trigger for negative absolute TSR — and the five-year gap being even wider, there is no mitigating track record to consider.

✗ AGAINST
Phoebe A. Wood3-year TSR trigger: LEG 3yr TSR -66.5% vs peer median +31.6%, gap of -98.1pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2005, long tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR check: LEG 5yr TSR -74.9% vs peer median +25.6%, gap of -100.5pp also exceeds 20pp threshold, no mitigant applies

Ms. Wood has served since 2005 and her lengthy tenure covers the full period of deep stock underperformance; the three-year gap of roughly 98 percentage points between Leggett's return and the peer group median is far above the 20-point trigger, and the five-year data confirms sustained underperformance of about 100 percentage points, with no longer-term outperformance period to act as a mitigant.

For Analysis

All eight director nominees receive a vote AGAINST. Leggett's shares lost about 67% over the past three years while the company's own disclosed compensation peer group gained roughly 32% on average — a gap of approximately 98 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point underperformance threshold applicable when absolute three-year returns are negative. The five-year comparison confirms the trend with an even larger gap of about 100 percentage points, eliminating the potential mitigant available when three-year underperformance is a recent departure from a solid long-term record. Every nominee has served more than 24 months and is therefore fully subject to the TSR trigger.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Karl G. Glassman

Total Comp

$10,893,870

Prior Support

95%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of approximately $10.9 million is broadly consistent with benchmark expectations for a CEO at a roughly $1–2 billion market-cap consumer cyclical manufacturer, and the pay structure is heavily weighted toward variable, performance-linked pay — the proxy states 87% of target CEO pay is variable, well above the 50–60% minimum threshold. The incentive plan design uses meaningful multi-year performance conditions (three-year EBITDA, ROIC, and relative TSR multiplier for the long-term equity awards), and the 2023 performance stock awards actually paid out at zero because the company missed its EBITDA and ROIC thresholds, demonstrating that the plan holds executives accountable for underperformance. Prior shareholder support was 95% in 2025, well above the 70% threshold that would require a response, and there are no structural concerns such as single-trigger change-in-control vesting, tax gross-ups, or absence of a clawback policy.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

35 yrs

Audit Fees

$2,911,061

Non-Audit Fees

$442,975

auditor tenure 35 years exceeds 25-year threshold; no compelling rationale for continued engagement disclosed beyond general audit quality statements

PwC has been Leggett's auditor continuously since 1991 — approximately 35 years — which exceeds the 25-year tenure threshold in the voting policy; the proxy does not provide a specific and compelling justification for continuing the relationship (such as a concrete multi-year rotation plan or exceptional independently verified audit quality metrics), so the tenure trigger applies and a vote against ratification is warranted; the non-audit fee ratio of about 15% (non-audit fees of roughly $443,000 against audit fees of about $2.9 million) is well within the 50% limit and raises no independence concern on its own.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Leggett & Platt ballot presents a mixed picture: the Say on Pay proposal earns a FOR vote because the compensation structure is genuinely performance-linked and the 2023 long-term awards paid out at zero when financial targets were missed, but all eight director nominees receive AGAINST votes due to Leggett's severe and sustained stock underperformance — roughly 98 percentage points below the company's own peer group median over three years — and PwC's ratification is opposed on auditor tenure grounds, as the firm has served continuously for approximately 35 years without a compelling case for continuation disclosed in the proxy.

Filing date: April 7, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

17 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

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AOSA. O. Smith Corporation
CSLCarlisle Companies Incorporated
DOVDover Corporation
FBINFortune Brands Innovations, Inc.
GFFGriffon Corporation
HNIHNI Corporation
LIILennox International Inc.
MASMasco Corporation
MLKNMillerKnoll, Inc.
OCOwens Corning
PNRPentair plc
SNASnap-on Incorporated
SGISomnigroup International Inc.
SCSSteelcase Inc.
TKRThe Timken Company