INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORP (IBOC)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORP · Meeting: May 18, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

8

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

8 FOR
✓ FOR
Javier de Anda

Director since 2015, no overboarding, all meetings attended, no TSR trigger fired (IBOC 3-year return of +85.7% vs QABA benchmark gap of +19.4pp is well below the 65pp threshold for strong positive TSR), and no independence or family relationship concerns.

✓ FOR
Douglas B. Howland

Director since 2010, audit committee financial expert, all meetings attended, no TSR trigger fired (gap vs QABA of +19.4pp is far below the 65pp threshold), and no overboarding or independence concerns.

✓ FOR
Rudolph M. Miles

Director since 2019, all meetings attended, no TSR trigger fired (gap vs QABA of +19.4pp is well below the 65pp threshold), and no overboarding or independence concerns.

✓ FOR
Dennis E. Nixon

Executive director and CEO since 1975, subject to the same TSR trigger as all directors — the trigger does not fire because IBOC's 3-year return of +85.7% exceeds QABA and the outperformance gap of +19.4pp is far below the 65pp threshold required to vote against a director where absolute TSR is strongly positive.

✓ FOR
Larry A. Norton

Director since 2010, all meetings attended, no TSR trigger fired (IBOC outperforms QABA by +19.4pp over 3 years, well below the 65pp against threshold), and no overboarding or independence concerns.

✓ FOR
Roberto R. Reséndez

Director since 2015, all meetings attended, no TSR trigger fired, and no overboarding or independence concerns.

✓ FOR
Antonio R. Sanchez, Jr.

Director since 1995 and classified as non-independent, but does not sit on the audit or compensation committee (proxy confirms he is not a member of either), all policy screens pass, and no TSR trigger fired.

✓ FOR
Diana G. Zuniga

Appointed February 2022 — fewer than 24 months had elapsed at the start of the relevant 3-year TSR window, making her exempt from the TSR trigger under the new-director exemption; no overboarding, independence, or attendance concerns.

All eight director nominees pass the policy screens. IBOC's 3-year price return of +85.7% outperforms the QABA community bank benchmark by +19.4 percentage points, well below the 65pp underperformance threshold that would trigger against votes for directors serving during a period of strong positive absolute TSR. All directors attended at least 75% of meetings, none are overboarded, and non-independent directors Nixon and Sanchez do not serve on the audit or compensation committees.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Dennis E. Nixon

Total Comp

$2,504,119

Prior Support

substantial majority%

Pay mix concern: fixed salary represents approximately 27% of total CEO pay, but the MIP incentive payment of $1,500,000 — which constitutes the bulk of variable pay — is structured with very low performance hurdles (0.90% return on assets OR 8% return on equity, only one of which needs to be met), making it function more like guaranteed pay than true performance-based compensationIncentive plan has no meaningful performance conditions: the MIP threshold targets are set well below historical performance levels and the award amount is fixed at $1,500,000 regardless of how far above the threshold performance lands — threshold equals target equals maximumCEO pay mix: salary ($670,000) is 26.8% of total $2,504,119 — technically within the 40% fixed-pay limit, but the MIP award is effectively fixed given the low bar

CEO Dennis Nixon received total compensation of $2,504,119 in 2025, consisting of $670,000 base salary, $1,500,000 in incentive plan compensation under the MIP, and $334,119 in other compensation including director fees and aircraft use. The core concern is the quality of the incentive structure: the MIP pays the same $1,500,000 whether the company barely clears a 0.90% return-on-assets hurdle or far exceeds it, and only one of two already-modest thresholds needs to be met — meaning this award functions as effectively guaranteed pay rather than true pay-for-performance. Additionally, the proxy states that 'we do not in practice use any performance measures to link compensation actually paid to company performance,' which the policy flags as a plan with no meaningful performance conditions. While IBOC's stock performance has been strong and CEO pay levels are not dramatically out of line for a $4.5B bank, the MIP structure — fixed payout, low hurdles, threshold equals maximum — fails the policy requirement that incentive pay have clear, measurable performance conditions that create meaningful differentiation between strong and weak outcomes.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

RSM US LLP

Tenure

19 yrs

Audit Fees

$1,706,062

Non-Audit Fees

$234,129

RSM US LLP was first retained on August 24, 2007, giving it approximately 19 years of tenure — below the 25-year threshold that would trigger a negative vote. Tax fees of $234,129 represent about 13.7% of audit fees of $1,706,062, well below the 50% threshold for independence concerns. RSM is a large national firm appropriate for a $4.5B market cap bank. No material restatements are disclosed.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 IBOC annual meeting ballot contains three proposals: director elections, auditor ratification, and a say-on-pay advisory vote. All eight director nominees receive a FOR vote based on strong 3-year stock performance relative to the QABA community bank benchmark and clean governance profiles; the auditor RSM US LLP also receives a FOR vote given acceptable tenure (19 years) and a low non-audit fee ratio of 13.7%. The say-on-pay vote receives an AGAINST recommendation because the company's primary incentive plan for the CEO pays a fixed $1,500,000 against minimal, easily-met hurdles with no differentiation between threshold and maximum performance — a structure that more closely resembles guaranteed pay than genuine pay-for-performance alignment.

Filing date: April 20, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

4 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

CFRCullen/Frost Bankers, Inc.
PBProsperity Bancshares, Inc.
TCBITexas Capital Bancshares, Inc.
VLYValley National Bancorp