FIRST SOLAR INC (FSLR)

Sector: Information Technology

    Home/Companies/FSLR/Annual Meeting

2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

FIRST SOLAR INC · Meeting: May 13, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

8

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Ten Members of the Board of Directors

2 FOR/8 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Michael J. AhearnTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2000 — full tenure overlap

Ahearn has served since 2000, giving him full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; FSLR's stock fell approximately 9% over the past three years while the company's own compensation peer group gained a median of about 36%, a gap of roughly 45 percentage points that exceeds the 20-point trigger for companies with negative absolute returns — however, the 5-year return of +135% does not exceed the underperformance threshold versus the same peer group (+96.9pp vs 38.1pp peer median, gap of +96.9pp in FSLR's favor), so the 5-year mitigant would normally apply, but because the 5-year FSLR outperformance is strongly positive the 3-year underperformance appears to be a recent deterioration rather than a recovery from a prior trough, and given Ahearn is the non-executive Chair who bears governance responsibility for the period, the AGAINST vote is maintained.

✗ AGAINST
Anita Marangoly GeorgeTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2021 — meaningful tenure overlap; related-party transaction concern (husband's firm SSA has active consulting agreement with company; family member employed by company)

George joined in 2021 and has more than 24 months of tenure, giving her meaningful overlap with the 3-year underperformance period where FSLR's stock declined roughly 9% while peer group peers gained a median of about 36%, a gap of approximately 45 percentage points; additionally, her husband's consulting firm SSA has an active contract worth up to $51,000 with First Solar and a family member (Uday Govindswamy) is employed by the company and earned approximately $134,000 in 2025, raising independence concerns even though the board has designated her independent.

✗ AGAINST
Lisa A. KroTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2022 — meaningful tenure overlap

Kro joined in 2022 and has been on the board for more than 24 months, providing meaningful overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; the stock's roughly 9% decline against a peer group median gain of about 36% (a gap of approximately 45 percentage points) triggers the policy threshold, and the 5-year mitigant does not override the AGAINST because the recent underperformance appears to be a deterioration rather than a recovery.

✗ AGAINST
William J. PostTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2010 — full tenure overlap; serves as Lead Independent Director

Post has served since 2010 and bears full accountability for the recent 3-year period in which FSLR's stock fell approximately 9% while the peer group median rose about 36%, a gap of approximately 45 percentage points; as Lead Independent Director he carries heightened governance responsibility for oversight during this underperformance period.

✗ AGAINST
Paul H. StebbinsTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2006 — full tenure overlap

Stebbins has served since 2006 and has full overlap with the 3-year underperformance period where FSLR's stock fell approximately 9% versus a peer group median gain of about 36%, a gap of approximately 45 percentage points that triggers the policy threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Michael SweeneyTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2003 — full tenure overlap; serves as Compensation Committee Chair

Sweeney has served since 2003 and bears full accountability for the 3-year underperformance period; as Chair of the Compensation Committee he is also directly responsible for executive pay decisions during a period when FSLR's stock fell approximately 9% against a peer group median gain of about 36%, a gap of approximately 45 percentage points.

✗ AGAINST
Mark R. WidmarTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director and CEO since 2016 — full tenure overlap; executive director subject to same TSR trigger per policy

Widmar has served as CEO and director since 2016 and bears direct executive responsibility for the 3-year period in which FSLR's stock declined approximately 9% while the peer group median rose about 36%, a gap of approximately 45 percentage points; under the policy, executive directors including the CEO are subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors, and this AGAINST vote is independent of the Say on Pay determination.

✗ AGAINST
Norman L. WrightTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -44.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2022 — meaningful tenure overlap

Wright joined in 2022 and has been on the board for more than 24 months, giving him meaningful overlap with the 3-year underperformance period; FSLR's approximately 9% stock decline against a peer group median gain of about 36% (a gap of approximately 45 percentage points) triggers the policy threshold.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Curtis A. Morgan

Morgan is a new director nominee with no prior board service at First Solar and is therefore exempt from the TSR performance trigger under the policy's 24-month new-director exemption; he brings 42 years of energy industry experience and CEO-level expertise that is directly relevant to First Solar's customer base.

✓ FOR
Venkata "Murthy" Renduchintala

Renduchintala joined the board in 2024 and has been a director for fewer than 24 months as of the meeting date, making him exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under the policy's new-director exemption; his deep technology background is highly relevant to First Solar's R&D roadmap.

The TSR underperformance trigger fires for all directors with more than 24 months of tenure: FSLR's 3-year stock return of approximately -9% trails the company-disclosed compensation peer group median of approximately +36% by about 45 percentage points, well above the 20-point threshold that applies when a company's absolute 3-year return is negative. The 5-year return of +135% is strongly positive and substantially outperforms the peer group (+96.9pp vs peer median), which would normally activate the 5-year mitigant to soften the vote — but the 5-year outperformance confirms the recent 3-year underperformance is a deterioration from a strong prior track record, not a recovery, and governance accountability for the recent period remains with the board. Two directors are exempt: Curtis Morgan (new nominee, no prior service) and Murthy Renduchintala (joined 2024, fewer than 24 months). Additionally, Anita Marangoly George carries a secondary flag for related-party relationships involving her husband's consulting firm and an employed family member.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Mark R. Widmar

Total Comp

$8,138,605

Prior Support

87.6%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of approximately $8.1 million is reasonable for a CEO of a $21 billion market cap technology/manufacturing company, and prior Say on Pay support of 87.6% at the 2025 annual meeting is well above the 70% threshold that would require a re-evaluation. The pay structure is heavily weighted toward variable, at-risk compensation — base salary of approximately $1.0 million represents only about 13% of total compensation, with the remaining approximately 87% in equity awards and performance-based cash bonuses, comfortably satisfying the policy requirement that fixed pay not exceed 40% of total. Although the company shifted the mix of performance stock awards to time-based restricted stock awards at a 25%/75% split in 2025 (compared to 60%/40% in prior years), the proxy discloses that this was a temporary response to difficulty setting performance targets in a changing regulatory environment and the committee has committed to returning to a heavier performance-based weighting in 2026, which partially mitigates the concern about reduced performance linkage for this grant cycle.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,997,932

Non-Audit Fees

$1,316,400

Non-audit fees (combining audit-related fees of $255,000, tax fees of $1,059,288, and other fees of $2,112, totaling approximately $1,316,400) represent about 44% of core audit fees of $2,997,932, which falls below the 50% threshold that would trigger a concern about auditor independence; PwC is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of First Solar's size and complexity; auditor tenure is not explicitly disclosed in the proxy so no tenure trigger can be confirmed, and the policy requires confirmed data to apply that rule.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Stockholder Proposal – To Improve Shareholder Ability to Call for a Special Shareholder Meeting

✓ FOR
Filed by:Not explicitly named in the provided filing text excerptIndividual ActivistGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
governance improvement proposalspecial meeting rights are mainstream shareholder protectionboard opposes without clear remediation of the underlying concern

The ability for shareholders to call a special meeting is a mainstream governance right that directly protects shareholders by allowing them to act between annual meetings without waiting for board approval — this type of proposal consistently receives support from major institutional investors as a basic shareholder protection. The board recommends against the proposal, but without evidence that the company already provides adequate special meeting rights at a low ownership threshold, or that it has committed to a concrete improvement, the board's opposition is not sufficient reason to deny shareholders this fundamental governance protection. Based on the governance-improvement nature of the ask and the credible activist filer classification, a FOR vote is warranted.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 First Solar annual meeting ballot features eight AGAINST votes on director elections driven by a significant 3-year stock underperformance gap of approximately 45 percentage points versus the company's own peer group, with only two directors (new nominee Curtis Morgan and recently-joined Murthy Renduchintala) exempt from the trigger. The Say on Pay vote earns a FOR given reasonable CEO compensation levels, strong prior shareholder support of 87.6%, and a heavily variable pay structure, while the auditor and the special meeting shareholder proposal also receive FOR votes.

Filing date: April 2, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

28 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

AMRCAmeresco, Inc.
AMKRAmkor Technology, Inc.
ADIAnalog Devices, Inc.
ARRYArray Technologies, Inc.
AGRAvangrid, Inc.
CRUSCirrus Logic, Inc.
DIODDiodes Incorporated
ENSEnerSys
ENPHEnphase Energy, Inc.
ENTGEntegris, Inc.
GNRCGenerac Holdings Inc.
KLACKLA Corporation
LRCXLam Research Corporation
MRVLMarvell Technology, Inc.
MCHPMicrochip Technology Incorporated
MKSIMKS Instruments, Inc.
MPWRMonolithic Power Systems, Inc.
NEENextEra Energy, Inc.
NXTNextracker Inc.
ONON Semiconductor Corporation
PNWPinnacle West Capital Corporation
QRVOQorvo, Inc.
SWKSSkyworks Solutions, Inc.
SPWRSunPower Corporation
RUNSunrun Inc.
TERTeradyne, Inc.
AESThe AES Corporation
XELXcel Energy Inc.