Dr. Arnold has served since October 2021, so her tenure fully overlaps the 3-year period during which Fluence's stock fell 9% while its disclosed peer group rose nearly 79% on average — a gap of nearly 88 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold that applies when a stock has lost value. The 5-year record is even worse, so there is no mitigating longer-term track record to override this result.

Mr. Bulls has served as Board Chairperson since October 2021, so his tenure fully overlaps the period of severe stock underperformance — Fluence lost 9% while peers gained nearly 79%, a gap of roughly 88 percentage points. As Chairperson, he bears direct accountability for board-level oversight during this period, and the 5-year record provides no mitigating relief.

Mr. Falú joined in September 2022, meaning his tenure covers more than half of the 3-year underperformance window, and the TSR gap of roughly 88 percentage points far exceeds the policy trigger. Additionally, the proxy explicitly discloses that Mr. Falú was the only incumbent director who failed to attend at least 75% of board and committee meetings in fiscal year 2025, which is an independent reason to vote against under policy.

Ms. Fessenden has served since October 2021, fully overlapping the period in which Fluence's stock dramatically underperformed its peers by nearly 88 percentage points over three years. The five-year record is worse still, so the longer-term mitigant does not apply.

Mr. von Heynitz has served as Audit Committee Chairperson since October 2021, so his tenure fully overlaps the period of severe underperformance — an 88-point gap versus peers over three years — and the five-year record offers no relief.

Mr. Meier has served since January 2020 and his tenure covers the full underperformance period and beyond; the 88-point 3-year TSR gap versus peers far exceeds the applicable trigger threshold, and the 5-year record is even worse, so no mitigant applies.

Ms. Mendoza joined in August 2022, so her tenure covers more than half of the 3-year underperformance window; the nearly 88-point TSR gap versus peers far exceeds the trigger threshold, and the 5-year record provides no offsetting relief.

Mr. Nebreda has served as CEO and director since 2021/2022, meaning his tenure as a director meaningfully overlaps the full underperformance period; under policy, executive directors are subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors, independently of the Say on Pay vote. The roughly 88-point gap versus peers over three years, with no 5-year mitigant available, triggers a vote against.

Mr. Shelton has served since January 2018, well before the underperformance period began, so his tenure fully overlaps — and predates — the 3-year window; the 88-point TSR gap versus peers and the even worse 5-year record both trigger a vote against.