FORTUNE BRANDS INNOVATIONS INC (FBIN)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

FORTUNE BRANDS INNOVATIONS INC · Meeting: May 5, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

2

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Three Class III Directors

1 FOR/2 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
A. D. David MackayTSR underperformance triggertenure overlaps underperformance period

Mackay has served on the board since 2011, so his tenure fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; FBIN's 3-year price return is -31.7% (absolute negative), and underperforms the sector benchmark XLI by -93.6 percentage points, far exceeding the 30pp trigger threshold for negative absolute TSR; the 5-year return is -51.1%, which also triggers against XLI over a longer horizon, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply and the AGAINST vote stands.

✗ AGAINST
Stephanie L. PuglieseTSR underperformance triggertenure overlaps underperformance period

Pugliese joined the board in 2023, which is more than 24 months ago; her tenure materially overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; FBIN's 3-year price return is -31.7% (absolute negative), underperforming XLI by -93.6 percentage points against a 30pp trigger threshold, and the 5-year return is also deeply negative (-51.1%), so the 5-year mitigant does not rescue the vote.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Brendan M. Foley

Foley joined the board in July 2025, which is less than 24 months ago, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under policy; he brings relevant consumer packaged goods CEO experience as Chairman, President and CEO of McCormick & Company.

Of the three Class III director nominees, Brendan Foley is exempt from the TSR trigger due to his recent appointment in July 2025 (under 24 months), warranting a FOR vote; Mackay and Pugliese both have tenure overlapping the severe underperformance period during which FBIN's stock declined -31.7% over three years while the sector ETF XLI gained 61.9%, a gap of -93.6pp that far exceeds the 30pp policy threshold for negative absolute TSR, and the deeply negative 5-year return means the 5-year mitigant does not apply, warranting AGAINST votes for both.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Nicholas I. Fink

Total Comp

$10,476,545

Prior Support

87%%

CEO total compensation of $10,476,545 is within a reasonable range for a CEO at an industrial company with approximately $4.5 billion in net sales and market cap, and the prior year Say on Pay vote received 87% support — well above the 70% threshold that would require a No vote absent remediation. The pay mix is strong, with 89% of the CEO's target compensation being variable and at-risk and 71% being performance-based, far exceeding the 50-60% policy minimum for variable pay. Although the annual bonus payout was very low (14% of target) reflecting genuine underperformance against plan metrics, and performance share awards paid out at only 89.8% of target, the incentive structure is working as intended by reducing realized pay when the company misses its goals, which is consistent with good pay-for-performance alignment.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$5,870,000

Non-Audit Fees

$671,000

Non-audit fees (tax fees of $669,000 plus other fees of $2,000 totaling $671,000) represent approximately 11.4% of audit fees ($5,870,000), which is well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; PwC is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of FBIN's size; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the filing so the tenure trigger cannot fire per policy.

Stockholder Proposals

3 proposals submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Approval of the Company's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Eliminate Supermajority Voting Requirements

✓ FOR
Filed by:Board of Directors (management proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
governance improvementeliminates 75pct supermajorityresponsive to prior shareholder vote

This is a board-proposed charter amendment that removes the requirement for 75% of outstanding shares to approve amendments to key governance provisions, replacing it with a simple majority standard under Delaware law — a clear improvement in shareholder rights. The board is bringing this proposal directly in response to strong shareholder support for a similar advisory proposal at the 2025 Annual Meeting, demonstrating genuine responsiveness. Eliminating supermajority voting requirements is a mainstream governance improvement that makes it easier for shareholders to effect change, and the policy supports such proposals.

Proposal 5

Approval of the Company's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Declassify the Board of Directors

✓ FOR
Filed by:Board of Directors (management proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
governance improvementmoves to annual director elections by 2029phased transition

This board-proposed charter amendment phases out the classified (staggered) board structure over three years, resulting in all directors standing for annual election beginning at the 2029 Annual Meeting — a significant improvement in board accountability to shareholders. Annual elections are a widely recognized best practice in corporate governance, giving shareholders the ability to evaluate every director's performance each year rather than once every three years. The phased transition is a practical approach, and the improvement from a fully classified board to annual elections is substantial and clearly benefits ordinary shareholders.

Proposal 6

Shareholder Proposal to Elect Each Director Annually

✓ FOR
Filed by:John CheveddenIndividual ActivistGovernance
credible governance activist filerannual elections is mainstream governance best practicecompany has already proposed declassification in proposal 5

John Chevedden is a well-known individual governance activist with a strong track record of submitting substantive governance proposals, and annual director elections are a mainstream best-practice governance improvement that clearly benefits shareholders by increasing board accountability. The board itself has acknowledged this by bringing its own declassification proposal (Proposal 5) to a vote at this same meeting, rendering the conflict between management and this shareholder proposal largely moot. A vote FOR this advisory proposal reinforces the signal that shareholders want full annual elections and supports the board's own declassification initiative, even though Proposal 5 is the binding mechanism that will actually effect the change.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 FBIN ballot includes six proposals across director elections, auditor ratification, say on pay, two board-proposed governance improvements, and a shareholder proposal on declassification; the most significant governance actions are the board's own proposals to eliminate supermajority voting and declassify the board, both of which warrant support, while two of the three director nominees (Mackay and Pugliese) warrant AGAINST votes due to FBIN's severe stock underperformance of -93.6 percentage points versus the XLI sector ETF over three years. The Say on Pay vote warrants support given strong pay-mix design and a prior year approval rate of 87%, with realized pay already reduced significantly by below-target performance against the company's own incentive metrics.

Filing date: March 30, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence