EVEREST GROUP LTD (EG)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

EVEREST GROUP LTD · Meeting: May 13, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

5

Directors AGAINST

6

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

5 FOR/6 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
John Amore3-year TSR trigger: EG 3yr return -4.4% vs peer median +60.5%, gap of -64.9pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate: EG 5yr +42.3% vs peer median +97.0%, gap of -54.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive 5yr TSRdirector since 2012, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Amore has served since 2012 and his tenure fully overlaps the period in which Everest's stock fell roughly 4% while the company's own peer group gained over 60% on average — a gap of nearly 65 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point trigger under our policy; the 5-year record does not rescue this result because the 5-year gap of about 55 points also exceeds the applicable threshold, so the underperformance appears sustained rather than temporary.

✗ AGAINST
William F. Galtney Jr.3-year TSR trigger: EG 3yr return -4.4% vs peer median +60.5%, gap of -64.9pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate: EG 5yr +42.3% vs peer median +97.0%, gap of -54.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive 5yr TSRdirector since 1996, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Galtney has served since 1996 and his tenure fully overlaps the period in which Everest's stock fell roughly 4% while the company's own peer group gained over 60% on average — a gap of nearly 65 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point trigger; the 5-year gap of about 55 points also exceeds the applicable threshold, confirming this is sustained rather than transient underperformance.

✗ AGAINST
John A. Graf3-year TSR trigger: EG 3yr return -4.4% vs peer median +60.5%, gap of -64.9pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate: EG 5yr +42.3% vs peer median +97.0%, gap of -54.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive 5yr TSRdirector since 2016, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Graf has served since 2016 (and became independent Board Chair in 2025) and his tenure fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period in which Everest's stock fell roughly 4% while peers gained over 60% — a 65-point gap well above the 20-point trigger; the 5-year data also fails the test, so the underperformance cannot be characterized as a brief recent dip within an otherwise solid record.

✗ AGAINST
Meryl Hartzband3-year TSR trigger: EG 3yr return -4.4% vs peer median +60.5%, gap of -64.9pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate: EG 5yr +42.3% vs peer median +97.0%, gap of -54.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive 5yr TSRdirector since 2019, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Ms. Hartzband has served since 2019 and her tenure fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance window; Everest's stock declined roughly 4% while the peer group returned over 60%, a gap of nearly 65 points that exceeds the 20-point threshold, and the 5-year comparison similarly fails, so no mitigation applies.

✗ AGAINST
Hazel McNeilage3-year TSR trigger: EG 3yr return -4.4% vs peer median +60.5%, gap of -64.9pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate: EG 5yr +42.3% vs peer median +97.0%, gap of -54.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive 5yr TSRdirector since November 2022, tenure overlaps full 3-year measurement period

Ms. McNeilage joined in November 2022, which means her tenure covers essentially the entire 3-year underperformance window; Everest's stock fell roughly 4% while peers gained over 60% — a gap of nearly 65 points exceeding the 20-point trigger — and the 5-year comparison also fails, so no mitigation is available.

✗ AGAINST
Roger M. Singer3-year TSR trigger: EG 3yr return -4.4% vs peer median +60.5%, gap of -64.9pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate: EG 5yr +42.3% vs peer median +97.0%, gap of -54.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive 5yr TSRdirector since 2010, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Singer has served since 2010 and his long tenure fully overlaps the underperformance period; Everest's stock fell roughly 4% while peers averaged over 60% gains — a nearly 65-point gap that far exceeds the 20-point trigger — and the 5-year comparison also fails, indicating sustained rather than temporary underperformance.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Laura Hayexempt: joined August 2025, within 24-month new-director exemption window

Ms. Hay joined the board in August 2025, less than 24 months before the meeting, so she is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under our policy, which gives newer directors reasonable time to contribute before being held accountable for prior-period performance.

✓ FOR
John Howardexempt: joined March 2025, within 24-month new-director exemption window

Mr. Howard joined the board in March 2025, less than 24 months before the meeting, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger and there are no other policy flags to raise.

✓ FOR
Allan Levineexempt: joined June 2025, within 24-month new-director exemption window

Mr. Levine joined the board in June 2025, less than 24 months before the meeting, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger and there are no other policy flags to raise.

✓ FOR
Darryl Pageexempt: joined May 2025, within 24-month new-director exemption window

Mr. Page joined the board in May 2025, less than 24 months before the meeting, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger and there are no other policy flags to raise.

✓ FOR
Jim Williamsonexempt: joined board January 2025, within 24-month new-director exemption window; TSR trigger evaluated independently of Say on Pay determination per policy

Mr. Williamson was appointed to the board in January 2025 as part of his appointment as CEO, placing him within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger regardless of his role as an executive director.

Of the 11 director nominees, 5 long-tenured independent directors (Amore, Galtney, Graf, Hartzband, McNeilage, Singer) receive AGAINST votes because Everest's stock has fallen roughly 4% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group gained over 60% on average — a gap of nearly 65 percentage points that far exceeds our 20-point trigger for companies with negative absolute 3-year returns; the 5-year comparison similarly fails, so no mitigation applies. The four directors who joined in 2025 (Hay, Howard, Levine, Page) and the new CEO-director (Williamson, January 2025) are all exempt as directors within 24 months of joining.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Jim Williamson

Total Comp

$8,952,500

Prior Support

94%%

CEO Jim Williamson's total compensation of $8,952,500 is reasonable for a newly appointed CEO at a $13 billion global reinsurer and does not appear to exceed benchmark thresholds for this title, sector, and market cap band; the prior Say on Pay vote received strong 94% shareholder support, signaling broad satisfaction with the compensation structure. The pay program has meaningful performance conditions — 50% of long-term equity awards are performance share units tied to return on equity and relative total shareholder return over three years, with payouts ranging from 0% to 200% of target — and the company maintains a clawback policy, stock ownership guidelines, and no single-trigger change-of-control provisions, all consistent with good pay governance.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

KPMG

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$7,345,464

Non-Audit Fees

$532,026

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $515,026 plus other fees of $17,000, totaling $532,026) represent approximately 7.2% of audit fees of $7,345,464, well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; KPMG's tenure is not explicitly disclosed in the proxy so no tenure trigger can fire, and there is no indication of material restatements or auditor adequacy concerns for a company of Everest's size and complexity.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Everest Group annual meeting features five long-tenured directors receiving AGAINST votes due to severe and sustained stock underperformance — Everest's shares fell roughly 4% over three years while the company's own peer group averaged gains of over 60%, a gap of nearly 65 percentage points — while four newly appointed directors and the new CEO-director are exempt from this trigger. The Say on Pay and auditor ratification proposals both pass our policy screens cleanly, and no stockholder proposals appear on this ballot.

Filing date: April 10, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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