3D SYSTEMS CORP (DDD)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

3D SYSTEMS CORP · Meeting: May 14, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

9

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

/9 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Malissia R. ClintonTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; tenure since 2019 covers full underperformance period

Ms. Clinton has served since 2019, well before the stock's severe decline, and the 3-year performance gap of 99 percentage points versus the company's peer group far exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold; the 5-year TSR gap of -46pp versus the peer 5-year median of -46% (net gap 0pp) does not clear the threshold, but the 5-year peer median is itself negative at -46%, meaning the 5-year absolute TSR for DDD at -92% versus peers at -46% is a gap of 46pp which does exceed the 20pp threshold, so the 5-year mitigant does not rescue the vote.

✗ AGAINST
Claudia N. DraytonTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold; tenure since 2021 covers substantial underperformance period (>24 months)

Ms. Drayton joined in 2021, more than 24 months before this meeting, so she is not exempt from the TSR trigger; the 99-percentage-point gap between 3D Systems' 3-year return and the peer group median far exceeds the 20-point threshold applicable when absolute TSR is negative, and the 5-year relative gap also exceeds that threshold, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply.

✗ AGAINST
Thomas W. EricksonTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold; tenure since 2015 covers full underperformance period

Mr. Erickson has served since 2015 and bears full accountability for the company's sustained underperformance; the 99-percentage-point gap versus peers over three years vastly exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold, and the 5-year data does not provide a mitigating outcome either, confirming a pattern of prolonged underperformance rather than a temporary dip.

✗ AGAINST
Jeffrey A. GravesTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; executive directors subject to same TSR trigger as all other directors

Dr. Graves has served as CEO and director since May 2020, well beyond the 24-month exemption window; as the policy explicitly states, executive directors including the CEO are subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors, and the 99-percentage-point underperformance gap versus peers is extreme, with no 5-year mitigant available given that the 5-year gap also exceeds the threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Jim D. KeverTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold; tenure since 1996 covers full underperformance period

Mr. Kever has served on the board since 1996 and is fully accountable for the company's performance trajectory; the 99-percentage-point 3-year TSR gap versus the company's own peer group is among the most severe underperformance scenarios possible, and no 5-year mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Charles G. McClure, Jr.TSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold; tenure since 2017 covers full underperformance period; serves as Board Chair

Mr. McClure has served as Board Chair since 2018 and director since 2017, giving him direct oversight responsibility for the period of severe underperformance; the 99-percentage-point gap versus peers triggers a No vote, and as Chair he bears particular accountability for governance and strategic direction during this period.

✗ AGAINST
Kevin S. MooreTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold; tenure since 1999 covers full underperformance period

Mr. Moore has served since 1999, giving him the longest tenure of any director on the board; his decades of oversight mean he bears full accountability for the company's performance, and the 99-percentage-point 3-year underperformance gap versus peers triggers a No vote with no available mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Vasant PadmanabhanTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold; tenure since 2020 covers substantial underperformance period (>24 months)

Dr. Padmanabhan joined in 2020, more than 24 months ago, so the 24-month exemption does not apply; the 99-percentage-point 3-year TSR gap versus peers is far beyond the 20-point trigger threshold applicable to companies with negative absolute TSR, and the 5-year comparison does not provide relief.

✗ AGAINST
John J. TracyTSR trigger: 3-year DDD return -82% vs peer median +17%, gap of -99pp exceeds 20pp threshold; tenure since 2017 covers full underperformance period

Dr. Tracy has served since 2017, well beyond the 24-month new-director exemption window, and the 3-year TSR underperformance of 99 percentage points versus the company's own peer group far exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold; no 5-year mitigant is available as the longer-term gap also exceeds the applicable threshold.

For Analysis

All nine director nominees receive an AGAINST vote because 3D Systems' 3-year stock return of -82% trails its own compensation peer group median (+17%) by 99 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger threshold applicable when a company's absolute return is negative; every director has served more than 24 months and is therefore subject to the TSR accountability trigger, and the 5-year data (DDD -92% vs. peers -46%, a gap of ~46pp) also exceeds the threshold, confirming sustained rather than transient underperformance with no mitigant available.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Jeffrey Graves

Total Comp

$1,487,950

Prior Support

89%%

The CEO's total compensation of approximately $1.49 million is modest for a technology-sector CEO of a company that, even at $280 million market cap, has substantial operational complexity with global operations; this level is likely at or below benchmark for a CEO in the technology sector at this market cap, and the prior say-on-pay vote of 89% was well above the 70% threshold that would trigger heightened scrutiny. The pay structure demonstrates genuine pay-for-performance alignment: no annual bonuses were paid to any executive because the company missed both its revenue and adjusted EBITDA targets, and the performance stock awards (which require significant absolute stock price appreciation of 20-50% annualized to earn anything) appear on track to pay out nothing given the company's current stock price below the $2.67 beginning price benchmark. The compensation program is heavily weighted toward variable pay including performance-linked equity, meets the pay-mix requirements, and includes a clawback policy — the overall structure is sound even though stock performance has been poor, because the incentive pay mechanisms have appropriately resulted in near-zero realized compensation for executives over the past three years.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

2 yrs

Audit Fees

$4,314,000

Non-Audit Fees

$97,000

Deloitte was only engaged in August 2024, giving it approximately two years of tenure — far below the 25-year threshold that would raise independence concerns; non-audit fees (tax fees of $95,000 plus other fees of $2,000, totaling $97,000) represent approximately 2.3% of audit fees of $4,314,000, well below the 50% threshold; and Deloitte is a Big 4 firm fully appropriate for a public company of 3D Systems' size and complexity.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 3D Systems annual meeting ballot presents a heavily contested director slate — all nine nominees receive an AGAINST vote due to the company's catastrophic 3-year total return of -82%, which trails the company's own compensation peer group by 99 percentage points, the most severe underperformance trigger scenario under the voting policy. The Say on Pay vote receives a FOR despite poor stock performance, because CEO pay is very modest at approximately $1.49 million, no bonuses were paid given missed financial targets, and performance stock awards appear on track to vest at zero — demonstrating that the pay structure is actually working as intended to align executive and shareholder outcomes.

Filing date: April 8, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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