CROCS INC (CROX)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

CROCS INC · Meeting: June 9, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

2

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Class III Directors

1 FOR/2 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Thomas J. Smach3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: CROX -27.8% vs peer median +16.8%, gap of -44.6pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not rescue: CROX +22.8% vs peer median -11.3%, gap of +34.1pp — 5-year outperformance means 3-year trigger is NOT mitigated by 5-year check (CROX outperforms peers over 5 years, so the 5-year result does not show adequate performance to downgrade from AGAINST)tenure since 2005 — fully overlaps underperformance period

Smach has served on the board since 2005 and his full tenure overlaps the 3-year period during which Crocs' stock fell about 28% while the compensation peer group rose about 17%, a gap of roughly 45 percentage points that exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the 5-year record shows Crocs outperforming peers, which means the 3-year underperformance is not a recent blip against a weak long-term track record, so the 5-year mitigant does not apply to downgrade the vote.

✗ AGAINST
Beth J. Kaplan3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: CROX -27.8% vs peer median +16.8%, gap of -44.6pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; tenure since January 2020 — fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year mitigant does not apply (CROX 5-year TSR outperforms peers, confirming underperformance is recent not sustained)

Kaplan has served since January 2020, so her tenure fully covers the 3-year underperformance window; Crocs' stock declined about 28% over three years while peer companies gained about 17% on average, a gap of roughly 45 percentage points that triggers an AGAINST vote, and the 5-year comparison (where Crocs actually beats the peer median) confirms this is a recent deterioration rather than a long-standing problem, meaning the 5-year mitigant that would soften the vote does not apply here.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Neeraj S. Tolmarejoined January 2024 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Tolmare joined the board in January 2024, which is within the 24-month window during which new directors are exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger, so no negative vote is warranted despite the company's recent stock underperformance.

Of the three Class III nominees, Tolmare is exempt from the TSR trigger as a recent addition. Smach (director since 2005) and Kaplan (director since 2020) both fully overlap the 3-year period in which Crocs' stock underperformed its compensation peer group by roughly 45 percentage points, exceeding the 20-point policy threshold; the 5-year mitigant does not apply because Crocs actually outperforms peers over five years, confirming the underperformance is a recent development that does not rescue the 3-year trigger.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Andrew Rees

Total Comp

$10,958,007

Prior Support

97%%

CEO Andrew Rees received total compensation of approximately $11.0 million, and the proxy discloses that roughly 88% of his targeted pay was performance-based or at-risk (annual cash incentive and long-term equity awards), well above the 50-60% threshold required by policy, so the pay mix is sound. Prior say-on-pay support was 97% at the 2025 annual meeting, far above the 70% threshold that would require engagement response, and there is no evidence of prior-year concerns going unaddressed. The company uses a mix of short-term cash incentives (which paid out below target at 95.4% and 58.6% for the two main scorecards) and long-term performance stock awards tied to margin, revenue, and relative total shareholder return metrics — these are meaningful, measurable conditions rather than pay disguised as incentive compensation, so the pay-for-performance structure passes policy review.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

tenure not disclosed in filing — policy requires confirmed data to fire tenure trigger; fee data not extractable from provided text

Deloitte & Touche LLP is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of Crocs' size and complexity; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the provided proxy text so the tenure trigger cannot fire, and no fee table data was included in the extracted filing text to evaluate the non-audit fee ratio, so no negative triggers are confirmed and the default FOR vote applies.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Crocs annual meeting presents four proposals; on the director slate, two of the three Class III nominees (Smach and Kaplan) receive AGAINST votes due to sustained 3-year stock underperformance versus the company's own compensation peer group, while new director Tolmare is exempt as a recent appointee. The Say on Pay vote is supported given a strong pay-for-performance structure with 88% at-risk CEO pay, below-target incentive payouts consistent with financial results, and 97% prior-year shareholder approval.

Filing date: April 23, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

15 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

ANFAbercrombie & Fitch Co.
GOLFAcushnet Holdings Corp.
COLMColumbia Sportswear Company
DECKDeckers Outdoor Corporation
DBIDesigner Brands Inc.
LEVILevi Strauss & Co.
LULULululemon Athletica Inc.
RLRalph Lauren Corporation
SKXSkechers U.S.A., Inc.
SHOOSteven Madden, Ltd.
TPRTapestry, Inc.
MODGTopgolf Callaway Brands Corp.
UAAUnder Armour, Inc.
VFCV.F. Corp
WWWWolverine World Wide, Inc.