Proxyanalyst LogoProxyanalyst
CompaniesSpecial SituationsExplorerAbout
Terms and Conditions & Privacy PolicySitemap

COMCAST CORP CLASS A (CMCSA)

Sector: Communication

ExecutivesDirectorsTrendsAnnual MeetingProxy Filings
    Home/Companies/CMCSA/Annual Meeting

2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

COMCAST CORP CLASS A · Meeting: June 10, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

5

Directors AGAINST

6

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Directors

5 FOR/6 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Kenneth J. Bacon⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: CMCSA 3yr TSR -13.6% vs peer median +84.2%, gap of -97.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2002, tenure fully overlaps; 5yr TSR gap of -88.1pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no 5yr mitigant applies

Mr. Bacon has served since 2002, meaning his tenure fully overlaps the severe 3-year underperformance period during which Comcast's stock fell approximately 14% while the company's own disclosed compensation peers returned a median of +84% — a gap of nearly 98 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point trigger threshold; the 5-year record shows a similar gap (-88pp vs. the same peer group), so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Madeline S. Bell⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: CMCSA 3yr TSR -13.6% vs peer median +84.2%, gap of -97.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2016, tenure fully overlaps; 5yr TSR gap of -88.1pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no 5yr mitigant applies

Ms. Bell has served since 2016, meaning her tenure fully overlaps the severe underperformance period; Comcast's stock declined roughly 14% over three years while the company's own peer group returned +84% at the median — a nearly 98-percentage-point gap — and the 5-year record is similarly poor, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Edward D. Breen⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: CMCSA 3yr TSR -13.6% vs peer median +84.2%, gap of -97.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2014, tenure fully overlaps; 5yr TSR gap of -88.1pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no 5yr mitigant applies

Mr. Breen, who also serves as Lead Independent Director, has been on the board since 2014, so his tenure fully covers the underperformance period; despite his significant governance responsibilities, Comcast's stock fell ~14% over three years against a peer-median gain of +84%, a gap nearly five times the policy trigger threshold, and the 5-year record provides no relief.

✗ AGAINST
Jeffrey A. Honickman⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: CMCSA 3yr TSR -13.6% vs peer median +84.2%, gap of -97.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2005, tenure fully overlaps; 5yr TSR gap of -88.1pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no 5yr mitigant applies

Mr. Honickman has served since 2005 and his tenure fully overlaps the underperformance period; Comcast's stock declined ~14% over three years while the company's own peers gained +84% at the median, a gap of ~98 percentage points, and the 5-year comparison reveals no improvement in relative performance.

✗ AGAINST
Asuka Nakahara⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: CMCSA 3yr TSR -13.6% vs peer median +84.2%, gap of -97.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since 2017, tenure fully overlaps; 5yr TSR gap of -88.1pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no 5yr mitigant applies

Mr. Nakahara has served since 2017, fully overlapping the underperformance period; Comcast's stock lost ~14% over three years while the company's own peer group returned +84% at the median — a gap of ~98 percentage points that is nearly five times the policy threshold — and the 5-year record provides no mitigating improvement.

✗ AGAINST
Brian L. Roberts⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: CMCSA 3yr TSR -13.6% vs peer median +84.2%, gap of -97.8pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director and CEO since 1988/2002 respectively, tenure fully overlaps; 5yr TSR gap of -88.1pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no 5yr mitigant applies; executive director subject to same TSR trigger independent of Say on Pay vote

Mr. Roberts, as Chairman and Co-CEO, has been a director since 1988 and his tenure fully encompasses the underperformance period; Comcast's stock declined ~14% over three years while the company's own disclosed compensation peers returned +84% at the median — a gap of ~98 percentage points — and the 5-year comparison shows an even larger absolute decline (-37%) with a peer gap of -88pp, providing no mitigant; as an executive director he is subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors, independently of any Say on Pay evaluation.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Thomas J. Baltimore, Jr.⚑ Director since March 2023 — less than 24 months at time of 3yr measurement window start; qualifies for new-director exemption

Mr. Baltimore joined the board in March 2023, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him; he brings relevant executive leadership and financial expertise from his role as Chairman, President and CEO of a major public hotel REIT.

✓ FOR
Louise F. Brady⚑ Director since October 2023 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Ms. Brady joined the board in October 2023, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply; she brings finance, venture capital and technology investment experience relevant to Comcast's strategic priorities.

✓ FOR
Michael J. Cavanagh⚑ Director since January 2026 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Mr. Cavanagh was appointed to the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply; as newly appointed Co-CEO he has not yet had meaningful opportunity to influence board-level outcomes.

✓ FOR
Wonya Y. Lucas⚑ Director since April 2024 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Ms. Lucas joined the board in April 2024, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply; she brings deep media and entertainment industry experience directly relevant to Comcast's content and streaming businesses.

✓ FOR
Gordon Smith⚑ Director since January 2026 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Mr. Smith joined the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply; he brings extensive financial services, consumer banking and risk management experience relevant to Comcast's governance needs.

The TSR underperformance trigger fires broadly across the incumbent slate: Comcast's 3-year stock return of -13.6% trails its own disclosed compensation peer group median of +84.2% by approximately 98 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold applicable when absolute TSR is negative. The 5-year comparison (-36.9% absolute, -88pp vs. peer median) provides no mitigant — the underperformance is sustained, not transient. Accordingly, all directors whose tenure meaningfully overlaps the underperformance period receive an AGAINST vote. The four directors who joined within the past 24 months (Baltimore, Brady, Lucas, Cavanagh, Smith) are exempt under the new-director exemption.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Brian L. Roberts

Total Comp

$35,148,413

Prior Support

90%%

The prior Say on Pay vote received 90% support — well above the 70% threshold that would require a response — and the program structure is genuinely performance-oriented: the long-term incentive program consists entirely of performance stock awards (PSUs) that vest based on absolute ROIC, relative adjusted earnings-per-share growth versus the S&P 100, and a relative total shareholder return modifier that imposes a -25% penalty if Comcast ranks in the bottom quartile and explicitly caps positive adjustments when absolute TSR is negative. The 2025 PSU payout from the 2023–2025 cycle came in at 108% of target after the relative TSR modifier cut the payout from 144% to 108% — demonstrating that the plan's downside mechanics actually worked as intended by penalizing poor shareholder returns even when internal financial metrics were met. The company has a clawback policy, strong stock ownership requirements, and no single-trigger change-of-control vesting, and the short-term bonus (paid at 110% of target, reflecting solid but not exceptional financial achievement) is tied to quantitative revenue, EBITDA and free cash flow metrics; taken together, the pay structure passes the policy screens, making a FOR vote appropriate on pay program design even while the board itself warrants AGAINST votes on performance-accountability grounds.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

63 yrs

Audit Fees

$34,500,000

Non-Audit Fees

$23,300,000

⚑ Auditor tenure 63 years — far exceeds 25-year threshold; no compelling rotation rationale provided⚑ Non-audit fees (audit-related $21.8M + tax $1.5M = $23.3M) represent 67.5% of audit fees ($34.5M) — exceeds 50% threshold

Two independent policy triggers both fire here. First, Deloitte has served as Comcast's auditor since 1963 — a 63-year relationship that far exceeds our 25-year tenure threshold, and while the proxy notes a new lead engagement partner was selected for 2026, a simple partner rotation is not a compelling justification for a six-decade auditor relationship. Second, non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $21.8 million plus tax fees of $1.5 million totaling $23.3 million) represent approximately 67.5% of core audit fees ($34.5 million), well above the 50% threshold at which the non-audit relationship raises independence concerns; the proxy notes that the large 2025 audit-related fees include work on the Versant spin-off, but one-time transaction context does not automatically waive the trigger under our policy.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Shareholder Proposal

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:Not fully identified in provided filing text — described as Proposal 4 with board recommendation AGAINSTOtherGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
⚑ Insufficient filing text provided to fully evaluate proposal substance, filer identity, or prior-year vote history

The proxy filing text provided in this analysis was truncated before the full text of Proposal 4 (the shareholder proposal) was included, preventing a complete evaluation of the filer's identity, the specific ask, and any prior-year vote history — all of which are required inputs under the policy framework. Because the policy requires filer classification as the primary signal and a full merits review before reaching a vote determination, and because insufficient information is available to apply those steps reliably, an ABSTAIN determination is returned rather than defaulting to FOR or AGAINST without adequate basis.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Comcast ballot presents a mixed picture: the Say on Pay vote earns a FOR on the strength of a genuinely performance-linked equity program, but six of eleven director nominees receive AGAINST votes because Comcast's stock has declined roughly 14% over three years while the company's own peer group returned +84% at the median — a gap nearly five times the policy trigger threshold, with no 5-year mitigant — and the auditor ratification earns an AGAINST due to both a 63-year auditor tenure and non-audit fees representing 67.5% of audit fees. The shareholder proposal cannot be fully evaluated due to truncated filing text and is returned as ABSTAIN pending complete disclosure review.

Filing date: April 24, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

11 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

GOOGLAlphabet Inc.
TAT&T Inc.
CHTRCharter Communications, Inc.
FOXAFox Corporation
METAMeta Platforms, Inc.
NFLXNetflix, Inc.
Paramount Skydance Corporation
DISThe Walt Disney Company
TMUST-Mobile US, Inc.
VZVerizon Communications, Inc.
WBDWarner Bros. Discovery, Inc.