CABLE ONE INC (CABO)

Sector: Communication

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

CABLE ONE INC · Meeting: May 14, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

7

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

1 FOR/7 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
P. Robert Bartolo3-year TSR trigger: CABO -85.7% vs peer median +41.6%, gap of -127.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR trigger also fires: CABO -94.2% vs peer median -1.6%, gap of -92.6pp exceeds 20pp thresholdDirector since 2023 — tenure exceeds 24-month new-director exemption

Mr. Bartolo has served since 2023 (more than 24 months), so he is not exempt from the performance trigger; Cable One's stock has fallen roughly 86% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group rose about 42% on average — a gap of 127 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point threshold — and the five-year record is equally severe, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Brad D. Brian3-year TSR trigger: CABO -85.7% vs peer median +41.6%, gap of -127.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR trigger also fires: CABO -94.2% vs peer median -1.6%, gap of -92.6pp exceeds 20pp thresholdDirector since 2015 — long tenure, full overlap with underperformance period

Mr. Brian has served since 2015 and his tenure fully overlaps the severe underperformance period; Cable One's three-year stock decline of 86% versus peers that gained 42% represents a 127-percentage-point gap well above the policy trigger, and the five-year data does not provide relief, so an against vote is warranted.

✗ AGAINST
Deborah J. Kissire3-year TSR trigger: CABO -85.7% vs peer median +41.6%, gap of -127.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR trigger also fires: CABO -94.2% vs peer median -1.6%, gap of -92.6pp exceeds 20pp thresholdDirector since 2015 — long tenure, full overlap with underperformance period

Ms. Kissire has served since 2015 and her tenure fully covers the underperformance period; the 127-percentage-point three-year gap versus peers fires the trigger, the five-year data provides no relief, and an against vote is therefore warranted independent of her otherwise strong financial qualifications.

✗ AGAINST
Mary E. Meduski3-year TSR trigger: CABO -85.7% vs peer median +41.6%, gap of -127.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR trigger also fires: CABO -94.2% vs peer median -1.6%, gap of -92.6pp exceeds 20pp thresholdDirector since 2019 — tenure exceeds 24-month new-director exemption and covers substantial portion of underperformance period

Ms. Meduski has served since 2019, giving her substantial overlap with the underperformance period; the three-year and five-year TSR gaps versus peers both far exceed the applicable thresholds, so the trigger fires and an against vote is warranted even though she recently stepped into the independent chair role.

✗ AGAINST
Sherrese M. Smith3-year TSR trigger: CABO -85.7% vs peer median +41.6%, gap of -127.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR trigger also fires: CABO -94.2% vs peer median -1.6%, gap of -92.6pp exceeds 20pp thresholdDirector since 2020 — tenure exceeds 24-month new-director exemption

Ms. Smith has served since 2020 and her tenure meaningfully overlaps the underperformance period; the 127-percentage-point three-year gap and the equally large five-year gap versus the company's own peer group both exceed the policy threshold, warranting an against vote.

✗ AGAINST
Wallace R. Weitz3-year TSR trigger: CABO -85.7% vs peer median +41.6%, gap of -127.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR trigger also fires: CABO -94.2% vs peer median -1.6%, gap of -92.6pp exceeds 20pp thresholdDirector since 2015 — long tenure, full overlap with underperformance period

Mr. Weitz has served since 2015 with full overlap over the underperformance period; Cable One shareholders have lost roughly 86% over three years and 94% over five years while the peer group was roughly flat or higher, far exceeding the policy trigger thresholds, so an against vote is warranted.

✗ AGAINST
Katharine B. Weymouth3-year TSR trigger: CABO -85.7% vs peer median +41.6%, gap of -127.3pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR trigger also fires: CABO -94.2% vs peer median -1.6%, gap of -92.6pp exceeds 20pp thresholdDirector since 2015 — long tenure, full overlap with underperformance periodOverboarding: serves on 4 public company boards (Cable One, Republic Services, Xometry, Graham Holdings) plus Sequoia Fund

Ms. Weymouth has served since 2015 with full overlap over the severe underperformance period, the TSR trigger fires on both three-year and five-year measures, and she also meets our overboarding threshold by sitting on four public company boards simultaneously — two independent reasons for an against vote.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
James A. Holanda

Mr. Holanda joined the board on February 16, 2026 — well within the 24-month new-director exemption — so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him, and he brings extensive cable and broadband operating experience as the newly appointed CEO.

Seven of eight nominees trigger the TSR underperformance policy: Cable One's stock has fallen roughly 86% over three years while the company's own disclosed peers gained about 42% on average, a gap of 127 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point threshold applicable when absolute returns are negative, and the five-year data provides no relief. The sole exception is newly appointed CEO James Holanda, who joined the board in February 2026 and is exempt as a new director. Ms. Weymouth additionally triggers the overboarding policy.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Julia M. Laulis

Total Comp

$10,159,056

Prior Support

86%%

Prior-year support was a healthy 86%, well above the 70% concern threshold, and the compensation structure is genuinely performance-heavy — approximately 91% of the CEO's pay was tied to performance conditions, bonuses paid out at only 44.6% of target reflecting actual weak results, and the program includes a robust clawback policy and no problematic features such as guaranteed raises or single-trigger vesting. While Cable One's stock performance has been severely negative, the incentive pay structure responded appropriately by delivering well-below-target payouts, which is exactly what a properly functioning pay-for-performance program should do; total CEO compensation of approximately $10.2 million includes a large equity component already worth far less given the stock decline, so the pay level does not appear to be out of line with what a CEO at a ~$540 million market-cap communications company might earn under benchmark norms.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

12 yrs

Audit Fees

$3,415,650

Non-Audit Fees

$2,000

PwC has audited Cable One since 2014 (approximately 12 years), well below the 25-year tenure threshold that would trigger concern; non-audit fees in 2025 were just $2,000 against audit fees of $3,415,650 — a ratio of essentially zero, far below the 50% threshold — and PwC is a Big Four firm appropriate for a company of Cable One's size and complexity.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Cable One annual meeting presents a sharply contested director slate: seven of eight nominees trigger the policy's TSR underperformance standard because the stock has lost roughly 86% over three years while the company's own peer group gained about 42%, and the five-year record offers no relief — against votes are warranted for all long-tenured directors except newly appointed CEO Holanda. The auditor and say-on-pay proposals both pass cleanly, with PwC's non-audit fees negligible and the executive pay program demonstrating genuine pay-for-performance by paying bonuses at less than half of target in a year of declining revenues and a net loss.

Filing date: April 7, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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