BOSTON OMAHA CORP CLASS A (BOC)

Sector: Communication

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

BOSTON OMAHA CORP CLASS A · Meeting: August 21, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

2 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Adam K. Peterson3-year TSR trigger: BOC -20.5% vs XLI +78.4%, gap of -98.9pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR does not mitigate: 5-year return -51.4% represents sustained long-term underperformanceDirector since 2015 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Peterson has served as a director and executive since 2015, giving him full accountability for the stock's -20.5% three-year return, which trails the sector benchmark XLI by 98.9 percentage points — far exceeding the 30-percentage-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the five-year return of -51.4% confirms this is sustained underperformance rather than a temporary dip, so no mitigating adjustment applies.

✗ AGAINST
Brendan J. Keating3-year TSR trigger: BOC -20.5% vs XLI +78.4%, gap of -98.9pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR does not mitigate: 5-year return -51.4% represents sustained long-term underperformanceDirector since 2016 — full tenure overlap with underperformance periodNon-independent director — classified as not independent due to prior employment

Keating has served as a director since 2016, giving him full tenure overlap with the severe stock underperformance; BOC's three-year return of -20.5% trails the XLI sector benchmark by 98.9 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-point trigger for companies with negative absolute returns, and the five-year return of -51.4% confirms this is not a temporary setback.

✗ AGAINST
Frank H. Kenan II3-year TSR trigger: BOC -20.5% vs XLI +78.4%, gap of -98.9pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR does not mitigate: 5-year return -51.4% represents sustained long-term underperformanceDirector since 2017 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Kenan has served as a director since 2017, meaning his entire tenure on the board coincides with the period of severe stock underperformance; BOC's three-year return of -20.5% lags the XLI benchmark by 98.9 percentage points, and the five-year return of -51.4% shows the problem is deep-rooted rather than recent.

✗ AGAINST
Jeffrey C. Royal3-year TSR trigger: BOC -20.5% vs XLI +78.4%, gap of -98.9pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR does not mitigate: 5-year return -51.4% represents sustained long-term underperformanceDirector since 2019 — meaningful tenure overlap with underperformance period

Royal has served since January 2019, giving him meaningful overlap with the multi-year underperformance period; BOC's three-year return of -20.5% is 98.9 percentage points below the XLI benchmark, far exceeding the 30-point trigger threshold, and the five-year return of -51.4% rules out any mitigating adjustment.

✗ AGAINST
Vishnu Srinivasan3-year TSR trigger: BOC -20.5% vs XLI +78.4%, gap of -98.9pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5-year TSR does not mitigate: 5-year return -51.4% represents sustained long-term underperformanceDirector since 2017 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Srinivasan has served as a director since 2017, giving him full accountability for the company's sustained stock decline; BOC's three-year return of -20.5% trails the XLI benchmark by 98.9 percentage points, and the five-year return of -51.4% confirms this reflects a prolonged failure to deliver shareholder value rather than a short-term fluctuation.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Thomas BurtJoined September 2024 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Burt joined the board in September 2024, which is within the 24-month window that exempts new directors from the TSR underperformance trigger, giving him reasonable time to contribute before being held accountable for prior performance.

✓ FOR
David S. GraffJoined January 2025 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Graff joined the board in January 2025, well within the 24-month exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him at this time.

The TSR underperformance trigger fires for five of the seven directors. BOC's three-year stock return of -20.5% lags the XLI industrials sector benchmark by 98.9 percentage points — more than three times the 30-point threshold that applies when a company has a negative absolute return. The five-year return of -51.4% rules out any mitigating adjustment based on a longer track record. The two newest directors (Burt, joined September 2024; Graff, joined January 2025) are exempt under the 24-month new-director rule. All five longer-tenured directors — Peterson, Keating, Kenan, Royal, and Srinivasan — receive AGAINST votes.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Adam K. Peterson

Total Comp

$671,164

Prior Support

96%+%

Pay mix concern: CEO compensation is entirely fixed salary with no bonus or equity in 2025Weak incentive structure: no formal performance-based program currently in place for CEO

The CEO's total compensation of $671,164 — consisting entirely of base salary and benefits with no bonus or equity — is modest for a company of BOC's size and almost certainly within or below benchmark for a CEO at a ~$450 million market cap industrials company, so the pay level test does not trigger a No vote. While the absence of any variable pay for the CEO is a structural weakness (the policy favors at least 50-60% variable compensation), it cuts in shareholders' favor here because the CEO is effectively absorbing all of the downside alongside shareholders — he has not received a bonus since 2021 despite the stock's significant decline. Prior say-on-pay support exceeded 96% at the last three annual meetings, and there is no evidence of a pay-for-performance disconnect given the CEO's voluntary sacrifice of any incentive compensation during years of underperformance.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

1 yrs

Audit Fees

$839,772

Non-Audit Fees

$173,408

Deloitte & Touche was only appointed in 2025 (replacing KPMG, which had served since 2020), so tenure is approximately one year and well below any concern threshold; the non-audit fees of $173,408 represent about 21% of audit fees of $839,772, which is comfortably below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns, and Deloitte is a Big Four firm fully appropriate for a company of BOC's size.

Overall Assessment

This is a three-proposal ballot covering director elections, auditor ratification, and say-on-pay. The dominant issue is severe and sustained stock underperformance — BOC's shares have lost 20.5% over three years and 51.4% over five years while the XLI industrials benchmark gained 78.4% over the same three-year period, a gap of nearly 99 percentage points that triggers AGAINST votes for five of the seven director nominees; only the two newest board members (Burt and Graff) are shielded by the 24-month new-director exemption. The auditor ratification and say-on-pay proposals both pass their respective policy screens and receive FOR votes.

Filing date: July 1, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence