AERSALE CORP (ASLE)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

AERSALE CORP · Meeting: June 11, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

4

Directors AGAINST

3

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

4 FOR/3 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Nicolas FinazzoTSR trigger: 3-year price return -61.2% vs peer median +176.5%; gap of -237.7pp vastly exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year return -43.4% vs peer median +148.3% gap of -191.7pp also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant; director since December 2020 (full tenure overlap)

As co-founder, Chairman, and CEO serving since December 2020, Mr. Finazzo has full tenure overlap with the severe stock underperformance period: AerSale's shares have fallen 61% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group gained 176% on average, a gap of nearly 238 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold; the five-year record (down 43% vs. peers up 148%) provides no relief, so the policy vote is AGAINST.

✗ AGAINST
Robert B. NicholsTSR trigger: 3-year price return -61.2% vs peer median +176.5%; gap of -237.7pp vastly exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year return -43.4% vs peer median +148.3% also exceeds threshold — no 5-year mitigant; director since December 2020 (full tenure overlap)

Mr. Nichols has served on the board since December 2020 — the full underperformance period — and the same catastrophic TSR gap that triggers a vote against Mr. Finazzo applies equally here; the five-year record does not rescue the position, so the policy vote is AGAINST.

✗ AGAINST
Lt. General Judith FedderTSR trigger: joined July 2022 (>24 months ago, >half of 3-year window); 3-year price return -61.2% vs peer median +176.5%; gap of -237.7pp vastly exceeds 20pp threshold; 5-year mitigant not applicable (tenure <5 years); mitigating context noted — joined after underperformance had already begun

Lt. General Fedder joined in July 2022, which is more than 24 months before this meeting and covers a meaningful portion of the three-year underperformance window; while she joined after some of the decline had already begun — which is worth noting as partial context — the policy still requires an AGAINST vote because the 3-year TSR gap of -237.7 percentage points is enormous, the five-year mitigant is unavailable given her tenure length, and the stock has not recovered.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Andrew Levy

Mr. Levy joined the board in April 2023, which is less than 24 months before the June 2026 meeting date (approximately 26 months), placing him in the policy's transitional zone — his tenure covers less than half of the three-year underperformance measurement window, and the policy directs a flag rather than an automatic AGAINST vote for directors in this position; given he joined well into an already-underperforming period, has relevant aviation and financial expertise, and his contribution window is limited, the vote is FOR.

✓ FOR
Thomas Mullins

Mr. Mullins was appointed in February 2025, which is less than 24 months before the June 2026 meeting; under the policy, directors who joined within the past 24 months are exempt from the TSR trigger, giving newer directors reasonable time to contribute before being held accountable for prior performance, so the vote is FOR.

✓ FOR
Carol DiBattiste

Ms. DiBattiste was appointed in April 2025, which is less than 24 months before the June 2026 meeting; she is exempt from the TSR trigger under the policy's 24-month new-director exemption, and her background in corporate governance, legal, and compliance is relevant to the board's needs, so the vote is FOR.

✓ FOR
Thomas Mitchell

Mr. Mitchell was appointed in April 2025, which is less than 24 months before the June 2026 meeting; he is exempt from the TSR trigger under the policy's 24-month new-director exemption, and his aviation supply chain and engineering background is directly relevant to AerSale's business, so the vote is FOR.

Three of the seven nominees — Finazzo, Nichols, and Fedder — receive AGAINST votes because they have served long enough to be held accountable for AerSale's devastating stock underperformance: the shares have fallen 61% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group gained 176% on average, a gap of nearly 238 percentage points against a 20-point trigger threshold for negative absolute TSR. The five-year record (down 43% vs. peers up 148%) provides no relief. The four newer directors — Levy, Mullins, DiBattiste, and Mitchell — receive FOR votes because they joined within or near the 24-month new-director exemption window and cannot fairly be held responsible for pre-existing underperformance.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Nicolas Finazzo

Total Comp

$7,062,230

Prior Support

87.5%%

CEO total compensation of $7,062,230 (including $6,000,000 in equity awards) is likely well above benchmark for a CEO at a $323M market-cap industrial company — policy CEO threshold is >+20% above benchmark triggers NoPay-for-performance misalignment: variable/incentive pay is above benchmark while 3-year TSR is -61.2% vs peer median +176.5% (gap of -237.7pp), a severe disconnect between executive pay outcomes and shareholder experienceCEO received no cash bonus (positive) but received $6M in equity grants at a deeply depressed stock price — the structure concentrates forward-looking equity upside for the CEO while shareholders have suffered severe losses

AerSale's CEO received total compensation of $7,062,230 in 2025, of which $6,000,000 was in equity awards — a very large grant for a company with a market cap of only $323 million that is almost certainly well above benchmark for a CEO at this size and stage, triggering the policy's CEO individual threshold. More importantly, this level of equity-based incentive pay fails the pay-for-performance alignment test: the stock has fallen 61% over three years while the company's own disclosed peer group gained 176% on average, a gap of nearly 238 percentage points, which means shareholders have suffered severe losses while executive equity grants remain rich. The prior say-on-pay vote was 87.5% in favor, so there is no prior-year failure to engage, but the structural pay-for-performance disconnect is severe enough to warrant an AGAINST vote on this year's program.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Grant Thornton LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$1,091,429

Non-Audit Fees

$37,947

The non-audit fees (tax compliance work of $37,947) represent only about 3.5% of audit fees ($1,091,429), well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; auditor tenure is not disclosed so no tenure trigger fires; no material restatements are mentioned; and Grant Thornton is a large national firm appropriate for a company of AerSale's size and complexity, so ratification is supported.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 3

Approval of Redomestication of the Company from Delaware to Texas, by Conversion

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:Board of Directors (management proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
Redomestication to Texas reduces shareholder litigation rights: raises derivative-suit ownership threshold to 3%, restricts books-and-records inspection rights, limits shareholder ability to act quicklySpecial meeting threshold raised from 25% (Delaware) to 50% (Texas) — a significant anti-shareholder change for minority shareholdersTexas Business Court is newly established with limited case law; loss of Delaware's mature, shareholder-protective jurisprudencePrimary stated rationale (reducing 'frivolous litigation') largely benefits management and directors, not shareholdersThe combination of board-only vacancy filling, 50% special meeting threshold, and weakened derivative rights represents an anti-shareholder package

This is a board-proposed charter amendment to move the company's legal home from Delaware to Texas; applying the charter amendment framework, the key question is whether the change improves or worsens governance relative to the current baseline. The proposed Texas structure materially weakens shareholder rights in several ways: the threshold for shareholders to call a special meeting jumps from 25% to 50% (making it much harder for minority shareholders to act), derivative lawsuit rights are restricted by a 3% ownership threshold requirement, and inspection rights for shareholders are narrowed — all changes that primarily benefit management and directors rather than shareholders. While the board cites cost savings and reduced 'frivolous litigation' as benefits, the loss of Delaware's mature and shareholder-protective body of case law, combined with the shift to a newer and less-tested Texas Business Court, represents a net reduction in shareholder protections that retail investors should oppose.

Overall Assessment

This is a challenging ballot for AerSale shareholders: three long-tenured directors including the founder-CEO receive AGAINST votes due to catastrophic stock underperformance (shares down 61% over three years versus peers up 176%), Say on Pay also receives an AGAINST vote due to the severe disconnect between rich CEO equity grants and shareholder losses, and the board's proposed redomestication to Texas receives an AGAINST vote because it materially weakens minority shareholder rights. The auditor ratification is straightforward and receives a FOR vote given clean fee ratios and an appropriate auditor for the company's size.

Filing date: April 28, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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