ARROW ELECTRONICS INC (ARW)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

ARROW ELECTRONICS INC · Meeting: May 12, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

3

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Eight Directors

3 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
William F. Austen3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +15.5% vs peer median +82.0%, gap of -66.5pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +23.0% vs peer median +66.2%, gap of -43.2pp exceeds 35pp threshold for strong-positive TSR tier — 5-year mitigant does not saveexecutive director (Interim CEO) subject to same TSR triggerdirector since 2020 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Austen has served on the board since 2020, meaning his entire tenure overlaps the period during which Arrow's stock lagged its peer group by 66.5 percentage points over three years (15.5% vs. a peer median of 82.0%), well above the 35-point trigger threshold; the 5-year check also confirms sustained underperformance (-43.2pp gap exceeding the applicable threshold), so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Steven H. Gunby3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +15.5% vs peer median +82.0%, gap of -66.5pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +23.0% vs peer median +66.2%, gap of -43.2pp exceeds 35pp threshold for strong-positive TSR tier — 5-year mitigant does not savedirector since 2017 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Gunby has served as a director since 2017 and as independent Board Chair, meaning his tenure fully overlaps the three-year period in which Arrow underperformed its peer group by 66.5 percentage points; the 5-year review shows a similar degree of underperformance (-43.2pp), confirming this is not a temporary dip.

✗ AGAINST
Andrew C. Kerin3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +15.5% vs peer median +82.0%, gap of -66.5pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +23.0% vs peer median +66.2%, gap of -43.2pp exceeds 35pp threshold for strong-positive TSR tier — 5-year mitigant does not savedirector since 2010 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Kerin has served since 2010, meaning his tenure fully covers the three-year period in which Arrow trailed its peer group by 66.5 percentage points; the 5-year check does not provide relief because the gap there (-43.2pp) also exceeds the applicable threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Carol P. Lowe3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +15.5% vs peer median +82.0%, gap of -66.5pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +23.0% vs peer median +66.2%, gap of -43.2pp exceeds 35pp threshold for strong-positive TSR tier — 5-year mitigant does not savedirector since 2021 — tenure meaningfully overlaps underperformance period (>24 months)

Ms. Lowe joined the board in 2021, which is more than 24 months ago and means her tenure substantially overlaps the three-year underperformance window; Arrow lagged its peer median by 66.5 percentage points over three years, and the 5-year picture is similarly weak, so neither the new-director exemption nor the 5-year mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Gerry P. Smith3-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +15.5% vs peer median +82.0%, gap of -66.5pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR underperformance vs peer group: ARW +23.0% vs peer median +66.2%, gap of -43.2pp exceeds 35pp threshold for strong-positive TSR tier — 5-year mitigant does not savedirector since 2020 — tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Smith has served since 2020, so his entire tenure overlaps the period in which Arrow's stock underperformed the peer group median by 66.5 percentage points over three years; the 5-year data confirms sustained underperformance, eliminating the mitigant.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Lawrence (Liren) Chendirector since 2024 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Mr. Chen joined the board in 2024 and falls within the 24-month exemption for new directors, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him.

✓ FOR
Michael D. Hayforddirector since 2024 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Mr. Hayford joined the board in 2024 and falls within the 24-month exemption for new directors, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him.

✓ FOR
Mary T. McDowelldirector since 2023 — within 24-month new-director exemption

Ms. McDowell joined the board in 2023 and falls within the 24-month exemption for new directors, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to her.

Arrow's 3-year stock return of +15.5% badly lags the company-disclosed peer group median of +82.0% — a gap of 66.5 percentage points, far exceeding the 35-point policy trigger for the low-positive TSR tier. The 5-year picture offers no relief (-43.2pp gap). Accordingly, all directors whose tenures meaningfully overlap this underperformance period receive an AGAINST vote. Three newer directors (Chen, Hayford, McDowell — all joined 2023 or 2024) are exempt under the 24-month new-director rule and receive FOR votes. No overboarding, attendance, or independence issues were identified for any nominee.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

William F. Austen

Total Comp

$4,347,295

Prior Support

98%%

The CEO's total compensation of $4,347,295 — consisting of a $1,200,000 base salary and a one-time RSU grant of $3,600,000 tied to his interim appointment — reflects a bespoke arrangement for a short-term internal appointment rather than a standard ongoing CEO pay package, and appears reasonable for an interim role requiring significant personal commitment. The compensation structure for the broader executive team is heavily performance-based (85% of target pay is variable and at-risk), uses multi-year performance metrics including relative EPS growth, return on invested capital versus cost of capital, and a newly added relative total shareholder return metric, and the prior say-on-pay vote received approximately 98% support with no structural concerns identified. No individual executive exceeded the policy's individual benchmark threshold triggers, the company maintains a robust Dodd-Frank clawback policy, and the pay mix comfortably exceeds the 50-60% variable pay requirement.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

49 yrs

Audit Fees

$14,162,165

Non-Audit Fees

$1,311,719

auditor tenure of 49 years exceeds 25-year thresholdno compelling rationale provided for continued engagement beyond standard efficiency/familiarity arguments

Ernst & Young has audited Arrow for more than 49 years, well above the 25-year tenure threshold that triggers a No vote under our policy; while the proxy cites institutional knowledge and competitive fees, these are standard efficiency arguments rather than the specific, compelling rationale (such as an active multi-year rotation plan or exceptional independent quality metrics) that the policy requires to override a long-tenure concern. The non-audit fee ratio (audit-related fees of $571,141 plus tax fees of $740,578 totaling $1,311,719 against audit fees of $14,162,165 equals approximately 9.3%) is well within the 50% threshold and does not raise independence concerns on its own, but the tenure issue alone is sufficient to warrant an AGAINST vote.

Stockholder Proposals

3 proposals submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Proposals 4a and 4b: Amend Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Remove Supermajority Voting Provisions

✓ FOR
Filed by:Arrow Electronics Board of Directors (management/board proposal)OtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
removes supermajority voting requirements — clear pro-shareholder governance improvementdirect response to majority-supported shareholder advisory vote at 2025 annual meeting

Removing supermajority voting requirements is a straightforward governance improvement that gives ordinary shareholders a greater say in major corporate decisions, and Arrow is bringing this charter amendment specifically because a majority of shareholders voted for it at last year's annual meeting. Under the charter amendment framework in our policy, proposals that move governance from a more entrenched baseline (supermajority thresholds) to a more shareholder-friendly one (simple majority) should be supported. Both Proposals 4a and 4b advance the same objective and warrant a FOR vote.

Proposal 5

Arrow Proposal to Provide Shareholders with the Ability to Call a Special Shareholder Meeting at a 25% Ownership Threshold

✓ FOR
Filed by:Arrow Electronics Board of Directors (management/board proposal)OtherGovernance
Board recommends: FOR
meaningful governance improvement — adds special meeting right where none currently exists25% threshold is market-standard and protects against minority activist disruption

Arrow currently provides no shareholder right to call a special meeting, so introducing a 25% ownership threshold is a genuine and meaningful governance improvement that gives significant shareholders a formal mechanism to force board action between annual meetings. A 25% threshold is consistent with market practice at large-cap companies and balances the interests of long-term institutional shareholders against the risk of short-term activist disruption. Supporting this proposal does not preclude shareholders from considering the companion 10% proposal (Proposal 6) on its own merits.

Proposal 6

Shareholder Proposal to Provide Shareholders with the Ability to Call a Special Shareholder Meeting at a 10% Ownership Threshold

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:Not specified in filing excerptOtherGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
Arrow is simultaneously offering a 25% threshold alternative (Proposal 5), which is a meaningful governance improvement10% threshold could enable small activist minorities to repeatedly disrupt board and management with special meetingsno prior-year vote history to signal urgency

While the ability to call a special meeting is a legitimate governance right, a 10% threshold is materially lower than the market norm for large-cap companies and could enable a very small group of shareholders — including short-term activists or special-interest groups — to force expensive and disruptive special meetings at will. Arrow is offering a credible 25% threshold alternative in Proposal 5 that meaningfully advances the same governance goal without the downside risk of minority-driven disruption. Given the availability of that alternative and the absence of any prior-year vote history suggesting urgency, a FOR vote on the 10% threshold is not warranted.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Arrow Electronics ballot presents six proposals; the most consequential governance issue is the company's severe 3-year stock underperformance relative to its own disclosed peer group (-66.5pp gap), which triggers AGAINST votes for five of the eight director nominees who have served long enough to be held accountable. On the positive side, Arrow is taking meaningful governance steps — removing supermajority voting requirements and introducing a shareholder right to call special meetings — which merit FOR votes, while Say on Pay passes on the strength of a heavily performance-linked pay structure, a reasonable interim CEO compensation arrangement, and near-unanimous 98% prior-year support.

Filing date: March 30, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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