AMC NETWORKS CLASS A INC (AMCX)

Sector: Communication

    Home/Companies/AMCX/Annual Meeting

2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

AMC NETWORKS CLASS A INC · Meeting: June 16, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

3

Directors AGAINST

7

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Directors

3 FOR/7 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Matthew C. Blank3-year TSR trigger: AMCX -49.9% vs peer median +50.6%, gap of -100.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate (-83.1% vs peer median -7.4%, gap -75.7pp exceeds 20pp threshold); director since 2022, tenure overlaps majority of underperformance period

Mr. Blank has served since October 2022, meaning his tenure fully overlaps the severe 3-year period during which AMCX lost about 50% of its value while the company's disclosed peer group gained over 50% — a gap of more than 100 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold that triggers a No vote; the 5-year record (AMCX -83% vs peers -7%) confirms this is sustained underperformance, not a temporary dip, so no mitigation applies.

✗ AGAINST
Carl E. Vogel3-year TSR trigger: AMCX -49.9% vs peer median +50.6%, gap of -100.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate (-83.1% vs peer median -7.4%, gap -75.7pp exceeds 20pp threshold); director since 2013, long tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; chairs both Audit and Compensation Committees

Mr. Vogel has served since 2013 and his tenure fully encompasses the period during which AMCX massively underperformed its peers both over 3 years (gap of more than 100 percentage points) and over 5 years (gap of nearly 76 percentage points), meeting the trigger for a No vote with no mitigating 5-year track record to offset it.

✗ AGAINST
James L. Dolan3-year TSR trigger: AMCX -49.9% vs peer median +50.6%, gap of -100.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate (-83.1% vs peer median -7.4%, gap -75.7pp exceeds 20pp threshold); director since 2011, long tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; sitting CEO of multiple public companies (MSG Sports, MSG Entertainment, Sphere Entertainment) — overboarding concern as sitting CEO with multiple outside board seats

Mr. Dolan has served since 2011 and his tenure fully overlaps both the 3-year and 5-year periods of severe underperformance relative to peers; additionally, as the sitting CEO of at least three separate public companies (MSG Sports, MSG Entertainment, and Sphere Entertainment), he holds more than two outside board seats while serving as a CEO elsewhere, which our policy flags as overboarding that undermines his ability to serve shareholders adequately.

✗ AGAINST
Aidan J. Dolan3-year TSR trigger: AMCX -49.9% vs peer median +50.6%, gap of -100.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate (-83.1% vs peer median -7.4%, gap -75.7pp exceeds 20pp threshold); director since June 2021, tenure overlaps full underperformance period; familial relationship with CEO (son of Chairman James L. Dolan, step-son of CEO Kristin Dolan); limited relevant business experience for a media company board

Mr. Aidan Dolan has served since June 2021, covering essentially the full 3-year and most of the 5-year underperformance periods; he is the son of the Chairman and step-son of the CEO, raising concern about independent oversight, and his disclosed experience — managing a band and launching an apparel line — provides limited basis for effective oversight of a complex media company, making a No vote appropriate on both the TSR trigger and qualifications grounds.

✗ AGAINST
Thomas C. Dolan3-year TSR trigger: AMCX -49.9% vs peer median +50.6%, gap of -100.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate (-83.1% vs peer median -7.4%, gap -75.7pp exceeds 20pp threshold); director since June 2011, long tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; familial relationship with Chairman/CEO (brother of James L. Dolan, brother-in-law of CEO Kristin Dolan)

Mr. Thomas Dolan has served since 2011, meaning his tenure fully encompasses both the 3-year and 5-year periods of severe underperformance relative to peers; as brother of the Chairman and brother-in-law of the CEO, his ability to provide independent oversight is also in question, reinforcing the No vote under the TSR trigger.

✗ AGAINST
Brian G. Sweeney3-year TSR trigger: AMCX -49.9% vs peer median +50.6%, gap of -100.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate (-83.1% vs peer median -7.4%, gap -75.7pp exceeds 20pp threshold); director since June 2011, long tenure fully overlaps underperformance period; familial relationship with Chairman and CEO (brother-in-law of James L. Dolan and Kristin Dolan)

Mr. Sweeney has served since 2011 and his tenure fully overlaps both the 3-year and 5-year periods during which AMCX dramatically underperformed its peer group; as brother-in-law of both the Chairman and the CEO, his independence is also a concern, supporting a No vote.

✗ AGAINST
Vincent Tese3-year TSR trigger: AMCX -49.9% vs peer median +50.6%, gap of -100.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year TSR does not mitigate (-83.1% vs peer median -7.4%, gap -75.7pp exceeds 20pp threshold); director since June 2016, tenure overlaps full underperformance period

Mr. Tese has served since 2016, covering the full 3-year and 5-year periods of sustained underperformance relative to peers (gaps of over 100 percentage points and 75 percentage points respectively), both of which exceed the applicable trigger thresholds with no 5-year mitigation available.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Debra G. Perelmandirector joined June 2023 — within 24 months of filing date; TSR trigger exemption applies

Ms. Perelman joined the board in June 2023, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period under our policy, so she cannot be held accountable for stock underperformance that predates or largely preceded her tenure; no other disqualifying flags are present.

✓ FOR
Christopher J. Coxdirector joined July 2024 — within 24 months of filing date; TSR trigger exemption applies

Mr. Cox joined the board in July 2024, which falls within the 24-month new-director exemption, so he cannot be held responsible for stock underperformance that occurred before or largely before his appointment; no other disqualifying flags are present, though his primary qualification appears to be legal/dispute resolution expertise and his family connection to the Dolan family is noted.

✓ FOR
Kristin Dolandirector appointed March 2026 — within 24 months of filing date; TSR trigger exemption applies as a newly appointed director; evaluated separately from Say on Pay

Ms. Dolan was appointed to the board only in March 2026, well within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR trigger does not apply to her in her director capacity; as CEO she is accountable for company performance through the Say on Pay vote, which is assessed separately under Proposal 3.

Of the ten director nominees, seven receive a No vote and three receive a For vote. The No votes are driven primarily by severe, sustained stock underperformance — AMCX has lost nearly 50% over three years while its disclosed peer group gained over 50%, a gap of more than 100 percentage points that far exceeds the 20-point policy threshold. Three directors (Perelman, Cox, and Kristin Dolan) qualify for the 24-month new-director exemption and are voted For. Additional concerns include overboarding for Chairman James L. Dolan (sitting CEO of multiple public companies) and familial entanglement throughout the Class B slate, which is dominated by Dolan family members and their in-laws.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Kristin Dolan

Total Comp

$12,525,644

Prior Support

92%%

The prior year Say on Pay vote received 92% support, well above the 70% threshold that would require visible changes, and the compensation structure appears sound: 81% of the CEO's total target pay is at risk (variable), which comfortably exceeds the 50-60% policy minimum. While AMCX's stock has severely underperformed peers over the 3-year period, the incentive pay structure uses meaningful performance conditions tied to AOI, free cash flow, and net revenues with pre-set targets, and actual payouts (annual bonus at 101% of target, long-term cash performance awards at 106.1% of target) reflect modest above-target performance on those internal metrics rather than windfall payouts disconnected from outcomes; additionally, a new special CEO performance award is explicitly tied to demanding stock price hurdles ranging from $9.50 to $17.50, directly linking future compensation to shareholder value creation. The overall pay program passes the policy screens.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

KPMG LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,568,000

Non-Audit Fees

$374,000

non-audit fee ratio exceeds 50% threshold: non-audit fees (audit-related $35K + tax $141K + other $198K = $374K) represent approximately 14.6% of audit fees alone on a strict basis, BUT per policy, audit-related fees should be included as non-audit — total non-audit = $374K vs audit fees of $2,568K = 14.6%; recalculating: all fees other than core audit = $35K + $141K + $198K = $374K; ratio = $374K / $2,568K = 14.6% — BELOW 50% threshold; tenure not disclosed in filing

KPMG's non-audit fees for 2025 (audit-related fees of $35,000, tax fees of $141,000, and all other fees of $198,000, totaling $374,000) represent approximately 14.6% of the core audit fee of $2,568,000, which is well within the 50% threshold; KPMG is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of this size; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the proxy, which is a minor negative, but per policy this alone does not trigger a No vote; the ratification vote is therefore supported.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 AMC Global Media annual meeting features a closely watched director election where seven of ten nominees receive No votes due to catastrophic stock underperformance — the company has lost nearly 50% over three years while its disclosed peer group gained over 50%, a gap of more than 100 percentage points — compounded by Dolan family control and overboarding concerns for the Chairman; the Say on Pay vote is supported given strong prior-year shareholder approval, a well-structured variable pay program with genuine performance conditions, and a new CEO award tied directly to stock price hurdles that align executive pay with shareholder outcomes.

Filing date: April 30, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

15 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

EAElectronic Arts Inc.
FOXFox Corporation
FUBOfuboTV, Inc.
IHRTiHeartMedia
LGF.ALions Gate Entertainment Corp.
LIONLionsgate Studios Corp.
NXSTNexstar Media Group, Inc.
ROKURoku Inc.
SBGISinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.
SIRISiriusXM Holdings, Inc.
Starz Entertainment Group
TTWOTake-Two Interactive Software Inc.
SSPThe E. W. Scripps Company
TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc.
Versant Media Group