Proxyanalyst LogoProxyanalyst
CompaniesSpecial SituationsExplorerAbout
Terms and Conditions & Privacy PolicySitemap

ALLSTATE CORP (ALL)

Sector: Financials

ExecutivesDirectorsTrendsAnnual MeetingProxy Filings
    Home/Companies/ALL/Annual Meeting

2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

ALLSTATE CORP · Meeting: May 22, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

11

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of 11 Directors

11 FOR
✓ FOR
Thomas J. Wilson

Allstate's 3-year total shareholder return of +96.7% outperforms the peer group median by +33.3 percentage points, well below the 65-point gap needed to trigger a vote against; no overboarding, attendance, or independence concerns apply.

✓ FOR
Richard T. Hume

Hume holds one outside public board seat (TD SYNNEX), is independent, attended all meetings, and the TSR trigger does not apply given Allstate's strong outperformance of its peer group over three years.

✓ FOR
Donald E. Brown

Brown holds no other public board seats, is independent, serves as Audit Committee Chair with confirmed financial expertise, and the TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Kermit R. Crawford

Crawford holds two outside public board seats (C.H. Robinson and Visa), which is within the four-seat limit for non-executive directors, is independent, and the TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Margaret M. Keane

Keane holds one outside public board seat (Tenable Holdings), is independent, attended all meetings, and the TSR trigger does not apply given Allstate's strong peer outperformance.

✓ FOR
Siddharth N. Mehta

Mehta holds two outside public board seats (Jones Lang LaSalle and Northern Trust), within the four-seat limit, is independent with confirmed financial expertise as an audit committee financial expert, and the TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Maria R. Morris

Morris joined in 2024 and has been on the board for approximately two years, placing her at the boundary of the 24-month new-director exemption; she holds two outside public board seats within the limit, is independent, and the TSR trigger does not apply given strong peer outperformance.

✓ FOR
Jacques P. Perold

Perold holds one outside public board seat (MSCI), is independent, chairs the Risk and Return Committee, and the TSR trigger does not apply given Allstate's strong outperformance of its peer group.

✓ FOR
Andrea Redmond

Redmond holds no other public board seats, is independent despite 16 years of tenure (the board has specifically evaluated and affirmed her independence), and the TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Perry M. Traquina

Traquina holds two outside public board seats (Morgan Stanley and eBay), within the four-seat limit for non-executive directors, is independent, and the TSR trigger does not apply.

✓ FOR
Monica J. Turner

Turner holds no other public board seats, is independent, joined in 2023 with three years of tenure, and the TSR trigger does not apply given Allstate's strong peer outperformance.

All 11 director nominees pass each policy screen: Allstate's 3-year total shareholder return of +96.7% outperforms the peer group median by +33.3 percentage points, far short of the 65-point gap required to trigger a vote against any director under the strong-positive-TSR tier; no director is overboarded; all independent directors attended at least 75% of meetings; all audit committee members have confirmed financial expertise; no familial relationships with senior management were disclosed; and no non-independent directors serve on the audit or compensation committees.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Thomas J. Wilson

Total Comp

$22,920,898

Prior Support

95%+%

CEO total compensation of approximately $22.9 million is elevated but is consistent with a large-cap financial services CEO ($54.8 billion market cap) who delivered a 96.7% three-year total shareholder return and net income of $10.2 billion in 2025; the compensation structure is well-designed, with approximately 93% of CEO pay being at-risk and performance-based through a combination of performance stock awards tied to return on equity and relative total shareholder return, stock options that only pay off if the share price rises, and a cash bonus linked to measurable operating targets. The prior Say on Pay vote exceeded 95% support, shareholders reported broad satisfaction with the program during engagement, a robust clawback policy is in place, and the pay-for-performance alignment check is satisfied because variable pay above benchmark is matched by Allstate outperforming its peer group by more than 33 percentage points over three years.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$11,642,000

Non-Audit Fees

$883,000

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $863,000 plus tax fees of $20,000, totaling $883,000) represent approximately 7.6% of the $11,642,000 audit fee for 2025, well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; auditor tenure is not disclosed with a specific year count so the tenure trigger cannot fire; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm fully appropriate for a company of Allstate's size and complexity; and no material financial restatements were identified.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Shareholder Proposal: Report on use of ESG and DEI Metrics in Executive Compensation

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:Not explicitly named in the provided filing textIdeological — ConservativeDisclosure
Board recommends: AGAINST
⚑ ideological conservative filer⚑ proposal targets removal of ESG DEI metrics consistent with conservative advocacy agenda

Based on the proposal title and the board's opposition statement — which notes that the metrics the proponent wants evaluated 'are not being used' — this proposal appears to be aimed at pressuring the company to eliminate or audit diversity and environmental metrics from compensation, a goal consistent with conservative ideological advocacy rather than neutral shareholder financial interests. Under the policy, proposals from ideological filers — whether conservative or progressive — are voted against regardless of how they are framed, because they serve political rather than shareholder-value goals. Even if the filer were considered credible, the board's disclosure that these metrics are not currently in use substantially weakens the case for a report, and prior-year vote data is not available to suggest widespread shareholder concern.

Overall Assessment

Allstate's 2026 annual meeting ballot is clean across all standard proposals: a well-qualified 11-person director slate passes all policy screens given the company's strong stock performance, the auditor fee structure raises no independence concerns, and the executive compensation program is well-structured with over 90% of CEO pay tied to measurable performance goals that were validated by a 96.7% three-year return and 95%+ prior Say on Pay support. The one stockholder proposal — requesting a report on the use of ESG and diversity metrics in compensation — is voted against because it appears driven by conservative ideological advocacy rather than neutral shareholder financial interests.

Filing date: April 10, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

13 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

AFLAFLAC Inc.
AIGAmerican International Group, Inc.
AONAON plc
CBChubb Limited
HUMHumana Inc.
Liberty Mutual
MFCManulife Financial Corporation
MMCMarsh McLennan
METMetLife, Inc.
PRUPrudential Financial Inc.
HIGThe Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.
PGRThe Progressive Corporation
TRVThe Travelers Companies Inc.